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THE VANISHING PUBLIC DOMAIN: ANTIBIOTIC
RESISTANCE, PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION AND
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
Kevin Outterson*

INTRODUCTION
Penicillin and other antibiotics were the original wonder drugs and laid
the foundation of the modern pharmaceutical industry. Human health
significantly improved with the introduction of antibiotics.1 By 1967, the U.S.
Surgeon General declared victory over infectious diseases in the United
States.2 But pride goes before a fall.3 The evolutionary pressure of antibiotic

*
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University. Kevin.Outterson@mail.wvu.edu. I am
grateful to IMS Health for the generous provision of a time series of antibiotic sales data which has been
utilized in this study. Portions of this Article were prepared for the World Health Organization Commission
on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health. Portions of Section II.C were presented as
testimony in hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions on
February 17, 2005. The Article was presented at the Second Annual Intellectual Property and
Communications Law and Policy Roundtable at Michigan State University in February 2005 and at the 29th
Annual Health Law Teachers’ Conference at the Baylor College of Medicine and the University of Houston
Law Center on June 2, 2005. Additional comments on this paper were received from Dr. Alan Schechter
(Pyro Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), Samantha Chaifetz (Yale University), Sanjay Basu (Yale University),
Matthew Rimmer (Australian National University), Aiden Hollis (University of Calgary), Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa (Case Western Reserve University), Dr. Joel Lexchin (University of Toronto), Andrew Farlow
(University of Oxford) and Caprice Roberts (West Virginia University). I am also grateful that Philip Allott
(Trinity College, University of Cambridge) encouraged us to think from the perspective of all-humanity.
David Davis provided valuable research assistance.
Finally, this article is indebted to the work of Professor Eric Kades, although I disagree with him on
many points.
1. STUART B. LEVY , THE ANTIBIOTIC PARADOX: HOW THE MISUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS DESTROYS
THEIR CURATIVE POWERS (2d ed. 2002). Life expectancy at birth in the United States has risen by about
13 years and 7 months since antibiotics became widely available. See ELIZABETH ARIAS, NAT ’L CTR . FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, 53 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPOR TS NO . 6, UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES, 2002,
at 29 tbl. 11 (2004) (reporting life expectancy values, which allows for the calculation of the
aforementioned increase via using the difference in life expectancy values for 1939-41 versus 2002). The
Infectious Diseases Society of America attributes much of that improvement to antibiotics, although the
data is not conclusive. INFEC TIOUS DISEASES SOC ’Y OF AM ., BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS ANTIBIOTIC
DISCOVERY STAGNA TES . . . A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 9 (July 2004) [hereinafter BAD BUGS].
2. See Ruth L. Berkelman & James M. Hughes, The Conquest of Infectious Diseases: Who Are
We Kidding?, 119 ANNALS OF INTER NAL MED . 426 (1993).
3. The full quote is: “Pride goes before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.” Proverbs
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use selects for resistant strains. Effective drugs should be used. But when
they are used, no matter how carefully, evolutionary pressure for resistance is
created.4 The problem is not limited to antibiotics. Variants of the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) develop resistance to anti-retroviral drugs.5
Antifungal agents face similar challenges. Even cancer cells may develop
resistance to pharmaceuticals.6 Tens of thousands of Americans are dying
every year from drug-resistant infections.7 Some pharmaceutical knowledge
is therefore exhaustible, and after patent expiration the public domain may
receive an exhausted drug. For these drugs, the public domain vanishes.8
Unwilling to live in a post-antibiotic era, society deploys two strategies
against resistance. One strategy is research and development (R&D),
allocating resources to discover new drugs. The other strategy is
conservation: reducing demand through health promotion and sanitation,

16:18 (New King James).
4. See David M. Livermore, Bacterial Resistance: Origins, Epidemiology, and Impact, 36
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES s11, s11 (Supp. I 2003); D.J. Austin et al., The Relationship Between the
Volume of Antimicrobial Consumption in Human Communities and the Frequency of Resistance, 96 PROC .
NAT ’L ACAD . SCI. 1152, 1152 (1999) (noting that the precise quantitative relationships are unknown at
present). Bacteria, viruses, parasites, and fungi are the major sources of infectious diseases that may
develop resistance to therapies. Livermore, supra, at s11. For an economic model of biological resistance,
see Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing
Biotechnologies (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 42, 2003), at http://www.feem.it/NR/
rdonlyres/2066F059-6A8F-434D-B750-1AC996B9A421/721/4203.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). But
see Roger L. White, How Do Measurements of Antibiotic Consumption Relate to Antibiotic Resistance,
in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 76 (Ian M. Gould & Jos W.M. Van Der Meer eds., 2005)
[hereinafter ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES] (“Proving a causal relationship between the use of antimicrobials and
development of resistance is very difficult; however they have been linked by a substantial amount of
evidence.”).
5. WORLD HEALTH ORG . (WHO), SCALING UP ANTIRET ROVIRA L THERAPY IN RESOURCE-LIMITED
SETTINGS: TREATMENT GUIDELINES FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 5 (2003), available at http://
www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/en/arvrevision2003en.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005); S. PUJARI ET AL.,
SAFETY AND LONG -TERM EFFECT IVENESS O F GENERIC FIXED-DOSE FORMULATIONS OF NEVIRAPINE-BASED
HAART AMONGST ANTIRETROVIRAL -NAÏVE HIV-INFECTED PATIENTS IN IND IA 3 (Nov. 18, 2003)
(background document for WHO meeting on Fixed-Dose Combinations for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria). For a recent news account concerning potential AIDS resistance, see Marc Santora & Lawrence
K. Altman, Charges of Premature Action Shadow AIDS Case Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at
A17.
6. For these cancer cells, the negative externality of waste is probably not present unless the
resistant cancer cells or genes spread to other individuals, akin to infection. See discussion infra Section
II.A (describing the waste externality).
7. Greg Groeller, Wyeth Has New Type of Intravenous Antibiotic, WALL ST . J., June 1, 2005, at
A16.
8. “Resistance limits the effectiveness of antibiotics over time and therefore decreases a drug’s
long-term profitability. Antibiotics and other antimicrobials are the only drugs where extensive use leads
to loss of benefit.” BAD BUGS, supra note 1, at 17.
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stewarding available antibiotic drugs, and prolonging their useful therapeutic
lives.
Both strategies face daunting challenges. R&D may encounter
increasingly diminishing returns, since the easiest biological targets may have
already been found. Echoing Malthus, some fear that science will be unable
to keep ahead of resistance.9 Conservation faces the unhappy prospect of
fighting an eternal rear-guard action, never winning, but merely postponing
the inevitable.10 Even the best conservation schemes may eventually fall to
resistance. Demand for antibiotics cannot be reduced to zero. Antibiotic
resistance may be analogized to running on a treadmill: R&D is learning how
to run faster, while conservation is slowing the treadmill down.11
This Article explores the vanishing public domain of exhaustible
pharmaceutical knowledge. It critiques several prominent proposals that
recommend solving the antibiotic resistance dilemma through strengthening
Intellectual Property (IP) law. This Article takes the opposite approach,
recommending the restoration and conservation of the public domain so that
the fruits of pharmaceutical innovation remain the common heritage of
humanity instead of becoming the exclusive property of the rich.

9. If resistance is a steady state based upon utilization, but discovery faces diminishing returns, at
some point the curves cross and resistance wins. Livermore, supra note 4, at s18 (noting the positions taken
by optimists and pessimists). This argument echoes the famous “geometric v. arithmetic” progressions
described by Thomas Malthus.
10. Some conservation strategies appear to work with some strains, but much work needs to be done
to understand exactly how and why certain conservation strategies work or not. See, e.g., the major review
study conducted by Parrino which found that many conservation strategies were effective in reducing
inappropriate antibiotic utilization. Thomas A. Parrino, Controlled Trials to Improve Antibiotic
Utilization: A Systematic Review of Experience, 1984-2004, 25 PHARMACOTHERAPY 289, 289-98 (2005);
see also Jerry Avorn & Daniel H. Solomon, Cultural and Economic Factors that (Mis)Shape Antibiotic
Use: The Nonpharmacologic Basis of Therapeutics, 133 ANNALS OF INTER NAL MED . 128, 128-35 (July 18,
2000) (describing effective programs to reduce unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotics). See Livermore,
supra note 4, at s19-20.
It is salutary to emphasize how much remains unknown. Does drug cycling have positive effects,
or does it lead to the accumulation of multidrug-resistant strains? At what prevalence of resistance
should empirical therapy be changed in different types of infection? To what extent does
combination therapy militate against resistance (except in the case of tuberculosis, where its value
is beyond dispute)?
Id. at s20.
11. The analogy is adapted from Goeschl & Swanson, supra note 4, at §§ 1-2.
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I. EXHAUSTIBLE PHARMACEU TICAL KNOWLEDGE
A. The Domains of the Patent Bargain
Patent law is the public creation of private goods. The public creates IP
law which creates the private domain of intellectual property rights and
duties.12 IP law permits the innovator to appropriate extra profits (rents) for
a limited period of time. Operating under the structure of law-based
appropriation,13 private IP goods are first created and then traded.
Patent law is also the private creation of public goods. Private firms
create knowledge that they may choose to disclose in a patent application. If
undisclosed, the knowledge remains in the private domain, protected by
contract and trade secrecy laws. If the knowledge is disclosed, it first enters
the patent domain, where use of the knowledge is regulated to support
pharmaceutical rent appropriation.14
After patent expiration or the publication of the trade secret, disclosed
knowledge fully enters the public domain as public law support for regulation
ends.15 Some knowledge bypasses the patent domain altogether and is created

12. While we have grown accustomed to speaking only of intellectual property rights, the
Hohfeldian framework should apply to intellectual property in a fashion similar to personal or real property.
Intellectual property duties deserve a more detailed analysis. For Hohfeld’s classic work, see WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFE LD , FUND AMEN TAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-64 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919).
13. Law-based appropriation is much broader than patent, copyright, and trademark law. In the
pharmaceutical industry in particular, many laws affect appropriation and rent extraction. See generally
Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 206-16 (2005) [hereinafter
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage].
14. Knowledge in the patent domain has some public value. Once disclosed, knowledge (or the
good produced under patent) can form the basis for research, work arounds, sequential invention, and
reverse engineering, subject to possible actions alleging infringement. Inadequate disclosures weaken the
value of the patent domain and force rivals to reverse engineer in order to discover the undisclosed.
15. For this Article, knowledge is in the public domain to the extent it is disclosed but lacks lawbased appropriation. Knowledge in the patent domain is likewise disclosed but enjoys law-based
appropriation from several possible sources, including patent law. Doctrines such as fair use or compulsory
licensure are intellectual property duties, fine tuning the degree of appropriation during the patent domain.
One advantage of this approach is that it focuses the question on “how much appropriation is enough?”;
a question too rarely asked in pharmaceutical patent policy. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at
220.
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for public use in the first instance.16 Just as all rivers flow into the sea,17 all
knowledge eventually flows into the public domain.
The patent and public domains are socially balanced in the patent
bargain,18 which offers the inventor a period of appropriation (an IP right) in
exchange for disclosing the invention to the public (an IP duty). When
knowledge is in the patent domain, the inventor enjoys legal support for
appropriation, while the public receives the opportunity to purchase products
that otherwise might not have been produced.
Knowledge in the public domain is a public good which shares two
essential characteristics: nonrivalrous by nature and inappropriable by law.
By its essential nature, knowledge is not diminished by joint or sequential use.
For example, we may utilize both Newton and Hawkins without rivalry; we
may agree with Jefferson on this point19 without diminishing him in the least.20
Whether knowledge is appropriable is a matter of law. Public domain
knowledge is available to all without rent extraction. No one is excluded (or
excludable) absent the legal tools of appropriation. Public domain knowledge
is especially valuable since it may be used without the deadweight losses and
innovation thickets21 associated with law-based appropriation. For example,

16. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV . 183, 183 (2004).
Merges cites several examples of private efforts to expand the public domain. The examples most relevant
to pharmaceutical knowledge deny appropriation rents to upstream R&D (DNA segments and computer
operating systems) while laying the foundation for downstream appropriation (genomic drugs, Linux
applications, and consulting). See id. at 186-93. Rents are shifted downstream, but nevertheless remain.
17. See Ecclesiastes 1:7. The geographic exception which proves the rule is the Great Basin, from
which no surface water flows into any sea. A trade secret which is never disclosed might be the IP
analogue.
18. The patent bargain is not the only possible theoretical justification for patent law, but it is one
commonly used in U.S. jurisprudence.
19. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Issac McPherson, 1813.
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from
one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature . . . incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men
to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will
and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.
Id.
20. While knowledge is not destroyed through use, it may lose value because it is inappropriable.
For example, market-moving financial information loses its value quickly, particularly as market
participants act on the information. This is a function of inappropriability, rather than exhaustion or rivalry.
From a societal perspective, knowledge does not lose value through use, but instead adds to the public
domain.
21. See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
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the Access to Knowledge (A2K) movement seeks a global treaty to maximize
the value to humanity of nonrivalrous knowledge. A2K advocates call for
permitting low- and medium-income communities to gain lower-cost or free
access to knowledge. One example would be free distribution of medical
journals in low- and middle-income settings. Essentially, A2K seeks to
modify the legal structures of appropriation of knowledge, permitting greater
appropriation by the poor instead of against the poor.22
In pharmaceutical markets, entering the patent domain means a new drug
may become available to treat human illness. When a pharmaceutical patent
is disclosed, the knowledge begins to enter the public domain in a limited
sense. The information can be observed and understood by all, and may be
used for further research.23 But the patent laws award to the owner exclusive
patent rights for the commercial exploitation of the drug. Full entry into the
public domain is delayed until after patent expiration. The patent domain
persists for about 14 years,24 and then generic drugs are able to enter the U.S.
market. At that point (or six months later),25 the pharmaceutical knowledge
completes its journey into the public domain.26 In the public domain, the

Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG . 698, 698 (1998).
22. For information on A2K, see www.cptech.org/a2k/ (last visited June 21, 2005). A draft A2K
treaty may be found at Access to Knowledge, Treaty on Access to Knowledge, May 9, 2005, at http://
www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf.
23. See generally Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., No. 03-1237, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4840
(June 13, 2005).
24. The exclusive marketing period is shorter than the 20-year patent term because several years pass
from the patent date until the drug is approved for marketing. By the late 1990s, the U.S. pharmaceutical
exclusive marketing period was approximately 14 years. CONG . BUDGET OFFICE , HOW INCREASED
COMPETITION FROM GEN ERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEU TICAL
INDUSTRY 45-48 (1998) [hereinafter INCREASED COMPETITION]. There is some evidence that the period
is longer for recent antibiotics. For the last two novel antibiotics approved by the FDA (Zyvox/linezolid
and Cubicin/daptomycin), the exclusive marketing period indicated by the FDA Orange Book is 14 to 21
years for Zyvox and 13 to 16 years for Cubicin. The patent and marketing exclusivity data for linezolid and
daptomycin are found in the FDA Orange Book, which is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.
htm (current through July 2005).
25. First-mover generic companies receive 180 days of generic exclusivity, which prolongs
appropriation of pharmaceutical rents for both companies by preventing market entry by rivals during the
period. Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
26. See INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 24, at xii-xiii. The patent holder continues to earn
pharmaceutical appropriation rents even after generic entry. These continued rents are supported by
goodwill, marketing, trademarks, and other intangibles. After patent expiration, many brand-name drugs
lose some market share, but actually increase in price (the so-called generic paradox). Incorporating these
facts into the model transforms the bright line of patent expiration into a fuzzy post-patent period of
declining rents or rent truncation. Rent truncation can also occur prior to patent expiration, either through
competition from a patented follow-on (“me-too”) drug, or by public legal restrictions on marketing and
reimbursement. See id.
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wonders of pharmaceutical innovation become freely available for world
public health. This is the great moment of payoff for global health.
Perhaps a 14-year layover in the patent domain provides a reasonable
balance between innovation and access. Rich consumers pay for and receive
the latest innovations (2005 medicine), while the poor might well be satisfied
with the less effective, but much less expensive, 1991 all-generic
pharmacopoeia.27 The World Health Organization (WHO) Essential
Medicines List, which historically excluded expensive patented medicines,
implicitly accepts the 14-year gap for the poor.28
A 14-year lag is one thing; waiting for eternity is another. The patent
bargain has been breached if a lifesaving drug is withheld from the poor
because it remains in the patent domain or if the drug is exhausted through
antibiotic resistance by the time it reaches the public domain. The rich will
have consumed a valuable resource, while the poor are left with nothing
except a cruel memory of a fading hope.29

27. The Earth Institute’s 2004 report adopts this position for cardiovascular medications because
“multiple, cheap medications are now available. Pharmaceuticals in nearly every class of drug used for
[cardiovascular disease] are now off patent. There is no need to wait for a global trade agreement.”
STEPHEN LEEDER ET AL ., A RACE AGAINST TIME: THE CHALLENGE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEAS E IN
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 73-74 (2004). Lipitor would be a prominent counter-example. The report also
highlights the marginal cost-effectiveness of some newer pharmaceuticals in resource-constrained settings.
See id. at 74.
28. The World Health Organization (WHO) Model List of Essential Medicines (14th ed. March
2005) does not say so clearly, but many commentators have identified the historic exclusion of many
patented drugs due to cost. See, e.g., Richard Laing et al., 25 Years of the WHO Essential Medicines Lists:
Progress and Challenges, 361 THE LANCET 1723, 1723-29 (May 17, 2003) (in 1999 only around 15 of the
306 products on the WHO list were patented), available at www.thelancet.com; Jillian Clare Cohen,
Developing States’ Responses to the Pharmaceutical Imperatives of the TRIPS Agreement, in THE
ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 125 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2002) [hereinafter E SSENTIAL
MEDICINES]; Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long
Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT ’L L. 27, 34 (2002); Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents
Under the Microscope, in ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra, at 88; Anna Thomas, Street Price: A Global
Approach to Drug Pricing for Developing Countries, in ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra, at 278. But see
Amir Attaran, How Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing
Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 155, 160 (2004) (claiming that the WHO never kept patented products
off of the Model List). Patented drugs were largely absent from the list due to cost, not just patent status
per se. But of course, patent status influenced cost, and, thus, placement on the list.
29. This statement is somewhat hyperbolic. Penicillin resistance was widespread 25 years after
introduction, but methicillin resistance took longer to appear. See BAD BUGS, supra note 1, at 10.
Methicillin resistance at 13 years was approximately 2%; at 41 years, resistance was 57.1%. Id. Newer
classes of antibiotics may suffer significant incidence of resistance in even shorter timeframes, perhaps due
to cross-resistance against existing therapies. Ramanan Laxminarayan, Introduction: On the Economics
of Resistance, in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 9
(Ramanan Laxminaryan ed., 2003) [hereinafter BATTLING RESISTANCE]. Fluoroquinolone-resistant
Pseudomonas aeruginosa reached over a 30% incidence of resistance within 14 years of introduction. BAD
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People living with AIDS in resource-poor settings have waited for a
decade for access to lifesaving antiretrovirals (ARVs). Almost six million
people in low- and middle-income populations are dying for ARVs today; only
12% of the people needing ARVs in poor countries received them as of late
2004.30 Just as ARV treatment in low-income countries is beginning to scale
up,31 resistance to first-line therapy is building.32 Second-line ARVs including
protease inhibitors33 are not generally available in generic or fixed-dose
combination (FDC) form.34 Patented second-line therapies are very expensive
in low-income countries. Even with voluntary discount programs, second-line
therapies cost 10 to 26 times more than the first-line drugs.35

BUGS, supra note 1, at 11. Vancomycin-resistant enterococci reached 25% resistance rates in the same
timeframe. Id. Antiretrovirals for AIDS appear to be developing resistance more quickly than methicillin.
See Sheila M.L. Waugh & William F. Carman, Strategies for the Rational Use of Antivirals, in ANTIBIOTIC
POLICIES, supra note 4, at 331-42 (describing how RNA viruses such as AIDS mutate much more quickly
than DNA viruses); Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Drugs’ Fast Rise in Asia Risks Resistant Strains, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A3 (citing a report by the American Foundation for AIDS Research (AmFAR)). Of
course, resistance to particular strains does not fully exhaust the drug; it only makes it less useful.
30. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION , “3 BY 5” PROGRESS REPORT 7 (Dec. 2004), available at http://
www.who.int/3by5/ProgressReportFinal.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). As of late 2004, approximately
700,000 people living with AIDS were receiving ARV treatment. Id. Approximately 5.8 million people
currently are untreated and will die within two years absent ARV therapy. Id.
31. See Ben Hirschler, Reuters, Generic Drugs Key to Uphill AIDS Fight, WHO Says (June 21,
2005) (describing scale-up efforts to increase access to ARVs in low-income populations), available at
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L21675875.htm (last visited June 22, 2005).
32. A. Winston & J. Stebbing, New Drugs for Old, 10 J. HIV THERAPY 11, 11-16 (Mar. 2005).
33. Protease inhibitors are a separate class of ARVs, typically used as a first-line treatment in
combination with Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors (NRTIs) and Non-Nucleoside Reverse
Transcriptase Inhibitors (NNTRIs), or as a second-line treatment when NRTIs and NNTRIs have failed due
to resistance or clinical intolerance. See, e.g., B.T. Roge et al., Drug Resistance Mutations and Outcome
of Second-Line Treatment in Patients with First-Line Protease Inhibitor Failure on Nelfinavir-Containing
HAART, 4 HIV MED . 38, 38-47 (Jan. 2003); B. Clotet, Strategies for Overcoming Resistance in HIV-1
Infected Patients Receiving HAART, 6 AIDS REV . 123, 123-30 (July-Sept. 2004); Amanda Mocroft et al.,
The Use of and Response to Second-Line Protease Inhibitor Regimens: Results From the EuroSIDA Study,
15 AIDS 201, 201-09 (2001).
34. A recommended second-line regime is TDF+ddI+LPV/r. Ellen ‘t Hoen, Médecins sans
Frontières (MSF) Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Presentation to the European Parliament
Comm. on Int’l Trade, Hearing on TRIPS and Access to Medicines at 6 (Jan. 18, 2005). Second-line
treatments also are important in conservation of resistance, and there is no FDC available for second-line
treatment as a result of the patents. See Alexandra Calmy et al., First-line and Second-line Antiretroviral
Therapy, 364 THE LANCET 329, 329 (2004), available at http://www.thelancet.com.
35. See ‘t Hoen, supra note 34, at 5-6 (explaining that second-line treatment in low-income
countries costs about US$3950 per year, and is as high as US$5000 per year); see also N. Kumarasamy,
Comment, Generic Antiretroviral Drugs—Will They Be the Answer to HIV in the Developing World?, 364
THE LANCET 3, 3 (2004), available at www.thelancet.com; MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE
WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (8th ed. 2005) (identifying
factors contributing to the price decrease for some first-line antiretrovirals), available at www.accessmed-
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Nor is this problem limited to AIDS. Many anti-malarial drugs are no
longer effective against Plasmodium falciparum after decades of use.36 The
American Enterprise Institute alleges that ineffective off-patent malaria drugs
(such as chloroquine) are routinely provided to developing countries by global
donors, while a more expensive patented drug combination is underutilized.37
Malaria annually afflicts 300 million to 500 million people, killing more than
1 million every year.38 Tuberculosis kills more than 2 million people per year,
and perhaps one third of the world’s population is infected.39 Multiple-drug
resistant tuberculosis is a major global disease, requiring the much more
expensive Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course (DOTS).40 Similar
stories could be told for the cervical cancer vaccine or chronic conditions such
as heart disease or depression.41 Whenever an innovative drug receives a
patent, the pattern may be repeated.
During the patent domain layover, millions of people may die, at least in
part, because they could not afford to pay the pharmaceutical appropriation
rent.42 Denying such drugs to low-income populations sacrifices access and
human rights on the doubtful altar of innovation.43

msf.org.
36. See Roger Bate, Giving the Poor Drugs that Don’t Work, Dec. 2, 2003, http://www.aei.org/
publications (last visited July 10, 2005). Cf. Bernard Pécoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor
Countries: A Lost Battle?, 281 JAMA 361, 363-65 (1999) (providing specific examples of resistant strains
in tropical diseases).
37. Bate, supra note 36. Malarial resistance to chloroquine runs to 80% in some locations; an
alternative drug, Artemisinin, is more expensive and underutilized, especially in combination therapy. See
id. But see Jack C. Chow, M.D., Letter to the Editor, WHO, Global Fund Get Best Medicine Available,
WALL. ST . J., Jan. 26, 2004, at A15 (responding to the Jan. 21, 2004 editorial and the underlying article
from The Lancet).
38. GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH , THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 2003-2004,
at 215 (2004), available at http://www.globalforumhealth.org.
39. Id. at 193.
40. Marilyn Chase, Drug-Resistance TB Hits New Group, WALL ST . J., June 8, 2005, at D13. See
also WHO, DOTS, at http://www.who.int/tb/dots/en (last visited July 4, 2005) (providing information
pertaining to DOTS).
41. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 248-50.
42. See generally id. at 250-75. A newer class of antibiotics—fluoroquinolones—works well with
drug resistant strains, but these drugs are expensive, leaving the poor with less-effective classes of
antibiotics. Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents Under the Microscope, in ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES, supra note 28, at 88.
43. Doubtful in the sense that innovation could have been protected without such a sacrifice.
Innovation and access are not necessarily in a zero-sum game. See infra Section II.C.
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B. Exhaustible Pharmaceutical Knowledge
The patent bargain assumes that information entering the public domain
remains there.44 This static assumption is not always appropriate when
considering dynamic living systems. Some pharmaceutical knowledge is
exhaustible (rivalrous) due to evolutionary response.45 In other words, when
pharmaceutical knowledge is exhaustible, it loses its nonrivalrous character.
This Article identifies this condition as “Exhaustible Pharmaceutical
Knowledge” or EPK.46
While generalizations are dangerous in this area of microbiology,
resistance generally proceeds more quickly the more a drug is utilized.47
Patient compliance is also an important factor,48 as is the location and intensity

44. It is of course possible to privatize elements of the public domain at a later date. Two prominent
examples would be the English Enclosure Movement and the U.S. Homestead Act which opened the
American West to white settlement. Privatization might occasionally be warranted for rivalrous goods such
as land for the reasons described by Garrett Hardin and others. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, SCI. MAG ., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243-48; Randall R. Dipert, Sidestepping the Tragedy of the
Commons, in THE COMMONS : ITS TRAGEDIES AND OTHER FOLLIES 27 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 2001).
Removing nonrivalrous knowledge from the public domain requires special pleading, such as controlling
the spread of nuclear technology in an antiterrorism program. Professor Kades Suggests withdrawing
expired antibiotic patents from the public domain, retroactively restoring the patent as a conservation
measure for exhaustible pharmaceutical knowledge. Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource:
Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW . U. L. REV . 611, 652-53 (2005). His prime candidate for
privatization is vancomycin: “a critical antibiotic of last resort for some lethal infections, that went offpatent decades ago.” Id. at 652. Vancomycin is an interesting choice, since the vast majority of U.S.
consumption (by kilograms) is by injection rather than oral tablets. Herbert A. Kirst, Diane G. Thompson
& Thalia I. Nicas, Historical Yearly Usage of Vancomycin, 42 ANTIMICR OBIAL AGENT S & CHEMOTHERAPY
1303, 1303-04 (May 1998) (letter to the editor). Vancomycin is an institutional drug, generally used in
hospital ICUs, quite different from the ambulatory examples proffered by Kades.
45. See supra note 4 (listing sources describing antibiotic resistance).
46. Most of the antibiotic economics literature chooses the word exhaustible as opposed to
rivalrous. I follow the literature, but with reservations. Exhaustible may falsely imply that the resource
is finite. Antibiotics are not finite, but may be created through innovation. In certain circumstances,
antibiotics may also be renewable, making them more analogous perhaps to fisheries than finite mineral
deposits. Exhaustible also implies a binary analysis: available or exhausted, whereas microbes develop
resistance progressively and cyclically, both geographically and with respect to different drugs.
47. “It remains plausible (but unproven) that a generalized reduction in prescribing may lead to a
reduction in resistance prevalence.” Livermore, supra note 4, at s19.
48. Usage does not necessarily result in resistance in a linear fashion, but many factors are involved,
including compliance with conservation protocols and the use of combination therapies. See infra Section
II.D.6. The primary point is that widespread, global use of an exhaustible drug will probably advance the
onset of resistance. See Livermore, supra note 4, at s11. Studies asserting linear associations at national
scales might well mask heterogeneity at community, institution, or individual scales. See, e.g., Werner C.
Albrich et al., Antibiotic Selection Pressure and Resistance in Streptococcus Pneumoniae and
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of use.49 Many factors affect the exhaustion rate of EPK and whether
resistance can be reversed. Conserving EPK to stave off resistance is a
complicated affair.50
Thus far, discussions of EPK have focused upon discrete packets of
knowledge, usually embodied in the patents listed in the FDA Orange Book51
for a particular drug. However, pharmaceutical knowledge may potentially be
exhaustible in a global sense. Some biologists believe that we have already
harvested the low-hanging fruit of easily discoverable antibiotics.52 Some are
beginning to suspect that perhaps the tree itself is bare.53 If the number of
possible antibiotic targets is finite, then resistance will eventually master them
all. This problem is not fundamentally changed if one discounts the word
finite but acknowledges that diminishing returns and increasing costs can
make the discovery of additional EPK economically impractical.54 In a global
sense, EPK may be a finite resource like fossil fuels.
The implications are profound. We are content to allow the market to
price fossil fuels with some subsidies for low-income users. For EPK, pricerationing is unacceptable.55 If EPK is finite like fossil fuels, investments in
traditional drug discovery R&D only hasten the day of exhaustion, and
conservation must be given first priority. Only conservation expands the total
treatment capacity over time. R&D priorities may need to be directed away
from traditional drug discovery and greater emphasis placed on conservation.

Streptococcus Pyogenes, 10 EMERGING INFEC TIOUS DISEASES 514, 515 (2004) (finding an “almost linear”
association between total volume of antibiotic consumption and prevalence of penicillin-nonsusceptible
streptococcus pneumoniae at national levels).
49. Fiona M. MacKenzie & Ian M. Gould, Quantitative Measurement of Antibiotic Use, in
ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 105 (“Although the greatest use in human medicine is in the
community, it is the intensive use of antibiotics in our hospitals that has the greatest impact on resistance.”).
50. Conservation of EPK is considered in infra Section II.D.
51. FDA ORANGE BOOK , supra note 24.
52. The phrase is attributed to Steven Projan of Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. Martin Leep, Antibiotics:
A Shot in the Arm, 431 NATURE 892-93 (2004).
53. NEED CITE
54. Gardner Brown & David F. Layton, Resistance Economics: Social Cost and the Evolution of
Antibiotic Resistance, 1 ENV ’T & DEV . ECON . 349, 351 (1996).
55. If the AIDS treatment crisis has taught us anything, we know that lifesaving medications cannot
be withheld from the poor merely because of their poverty.
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C. Common Pool Resources
Exhaustible goods which are inappropriable represent the paradigm case
of the tragedy (or fable)56 of the commons: the overgrazed common pasture.57
This Article employs the term common pool resources, which brackets the
question of whether the commons were tragic or comedic.58
Some common pool resources are effectively managed through
consensual coordination mechanisms.59 Others are coordinated through
government action.60 Still others are governed by private property rights: the
inappropriable is made appropriable by law. Common pool resources are
privatized, and the commons is enclosed. Property law saves the commons by
destroying it.
Some legal duties are also imposed therewith. The new property owner
may be expected to pay the public for the resources withdrawn from the
common pool. The owner of the newly propertized and privatized resource
should also comply with general property laws.61 Common pool resources
which have been privatized should still be subject to public regulation (the
imposition of duties) for negative externalities such as pollution or nuisance.
EPK in its natural (anarchical, pre-legal) state is a common pool resource,
both rivalrous and inappropriable. IP law transforms EPK into private
property, withdrawing a common pool resource and creating a private property
interest. The common pool of knowledge has been augmented through

56. Empirically, the “tragedy” does not always occur, such as when users of the commons cooperate
without carving the resource up into property fiefdoms. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV . 711 (1986).
57. Pastures are renewable resources, dampening their rivalrous natures until an ecological tipping
point is reached. Even if the resources are not degraded through gross overuse, conservation by a single
owner might well result in supra-optimal production. For perfectly non-renewable resources (e.g.,
propulsion fuel on Apollo 13), rivalry is apparent much sooner. Some antibiotic resistance may be partially
reversible, placing EPK in the renewable resource category, akin to forests or fisheries. Livermore, supra
note 4, at s18-19. But see Kades, supra note 44, at 619-21.
58. Public fisheries and forests are examples of common pools. Fisheries and forests are rivalrous,
but can be indefinitely renewable if properly managed.
59. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW : HOW NEIGHBO RS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1994); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS : THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Rose, supra note 56.
60. Pollution control is a classic example. The environment is the common pool.
61. Professor Michael Carrier has analyzed whether common law property norms might limit
intellectual property rights in a similar vein. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual
Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004).
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innovation62 and then privatized in a patent. The law which permits
propertization encourages innovation and the creation of additional common
pool EPK resources. The pie gets bigger when it is sliced and sold.63
However, patents are not perpetual property rights.64 Under current law,
patents65 are technically valid for 20 years,66 with an effective patent life for
pharmaceuticals of about 14 years.67 Time-limited property rights for EPK
create interesting externalities. These externalities occur both before and after
appropriation and in both the patent and public domains. They are largely
negative, which calls for the imposition of Pigovian taxes when property
rights are concerned, or social management when the public domain is
concerned. I now turn to those externalities in some detail.
II. EPK EXTERNALITIES
An externality arises when actors (firms or individuals) do not capture or
account for all of the costs or benefits from their actions. A factory that

62. The ability to create additional knowledge through R&D is a major departure from the paradigm
case of the finite and exhaustible commons, as shall be explored below.
63. My children would be pleased.
64. Unless Professor Kades carries the day.
65. In addition to patents, pharmaceuticals may enjoy “exclusive marketing rights” under various
FDA incentives. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000). For the purposes of this Article, exclusive marketing
rights are identical to patents in that they permit appropriation by the innovator. In lieu of repeating
“patents and exclusive marketing rights,” this Article will use the more general term “patents” unless the
context clearly requires otherwise.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement]. The United States implemented the
WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
TRIPS permitted many developing countries to implement on a delayed basis. TRIPS, 33 I.L.M. 81, at arts.
65-66. Most developing countries must implement the TRIPS Agreement by January 1, 2005, but the 30
“least developed countries” (LDCs) may defer full implementation for pharmaceutical products until 2016.
WORLD TRADE ORG . (WTO), DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL 2001, DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND PUBLIC HEALTH, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 7 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter D OHA DECLARATION ON
TRIPS]. Despite these concessions, all but three of Africa’s LDCs have already adopted patent laws for
pharmaceuticals. PHIL THORPE , STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT BY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Study Paper No. 7), at http://www.
iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/study_papers.htm (last visited July 10, 2005). TRIPS merely sets
minimum periods of IP protection; the United States can still unilaterally extend patent protection and has
done so with copyright. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). WTO Members are also free to negotiate
so-called “TRIPS-plus” agreements with additional provisions requiring protections in excess of the TRIPS
Agreement’s minimum standards. See, e.g., Kevin Outterson, Agony in the Antipodes: The Generic Drug
Provisions of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, 2 J. GENERIC MED . (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter
Outterson, Agony in the Antipodes].
67. See supra note ___. NEED CITE
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belches pollution in an unregulated environment creates a negative externality.
A drugmaker that sells a lifesaving pill for $1 creates a positive externality:
health at a bargain.
The language of externalities is another way of saying that the actor
should take a broader point of view and account for consequences more
carefully. Decisions would be more rational if the actor accounted for all of
the costs and benefits to all humanity. Microeconomics can be a God-game,
thriving under conditions of omniscience.68
Two broad solutions may respond to externalities: internalization and
collective action. Internalization brings the costs or benefits directly to the
actor, either by expanding the boundaries of the actor (enlarging the firm or
creating a property right)69 or by imposing a Pigovian tax (e.g., on pollution)
or subsidy (e.g., tax credit for charitable giving) on the actor. Internalization
is generally thought to be a “market-based” approach, since the actor directly
responds to price and ownership forces. This characterization is perhaps too
simplistic. Professor Kades posits two policy options for addressing the
negative externalities of antibiotic use: Pigovian taxes70 and extended patent
rights.71 Both options require government intervention into the free market,
either through direct taxes or subsidies on various aspects of antibiotic use, or
extended patent terms (patent monopolies) for useful antibiotics.
Internalization should be seen for what it is: government intervention against
a free market to alter incentives and change behavior.
Externalities may also be addressed through collective action. Collective
action requires atomistic actors to cooperate and move towards a common
goal.72 Extended families, civil society organizations, and trade associations
are examples of collective action mechanisms, as is the democratic lawmaking
process, which creates legal norms enforced by the state (e.g., pollution is
illegal; free public education is mandatory). Collective action is generally
regarded as a “regulatory” approach, although many of the possible collective

68. As in the Sims, giving the player a God-level view of society’s possibilities.
69. Expanding the boundaries of the firm can also permit pre-patent innovation in the private
domain. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the
Boundaries of the Firm 6 (Harv. Law School, John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Economics, and Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 480 (2004); U. of Pa. Law School, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
04-19 (2004)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=559195 (last visited
July 10, 2005).
70. Kades, supra note 44, at 635-43.
71. Id. at 643-59.
72. Collective action generally involves monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to minimize
noncompliance.
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action strategies hardly fit this label. Consider the efforts of hospitals to
control antibiotic-resistant infections in intensive care units (ICUs). These
efforts include sterilization, isolation, and careful use of antibiotics in the
hospital. The modes of action include establishing hospital procedures,
education of providers, benchmarking, and peer review. The efforts of
insurance companies and other payors to reduce inappropriate community
prescribing of antibiotics are also collective action strategies which defy easy
pigeonholing as “regulatory,” at least in the typical sense of governmental topdown “command and control” regulation.73 For EPK, some collective action
is collaborative; subsidiarity is respected when the people most closely
affected by the situation and most intimately aware of the circumstances (such
as the ICU staff) work out flexible and context-dependent local solutions. The
following sections describe externalities that affect EPK, together with
possible approaches to resolve them.
A. Waste
A property owner with only one year remaining on a lease cannot be
relied upon to manage the resource for the long term. Similarly, an EPK
owner facing patent rent truncation may choose to maximize current sales
rather than manage the resource for the long term.74
The common law addressed the problem of time-limited real property
rights in the tort action of waste. The holder of a tenancy by years or a life
estate could not clear-cut the forest or dismantle the manor house without
standing to answer for waste to the landlord or holder of the reversion. By
1278, the Statute of Gloucester provided for treble damages for such waste.75
In today’s environment, pharmaceutical companies hold time-limited
property rights to be much more valuable than any medieval manse. Evidence
suggests pharmaceutical companies may be wasting EPK through overly
aggressive marketing before the applicable drug joins the public domain.76 In

73. Kades uses the label “command/control” in this context, analogizing medical education to reduce
inappropriate prescriptions as akin to old-line communist command and control economies. Id. at 635.
74. Truncation of patent rents may occur prior to patent expiration if patented follow-on innovation
(“me-too” drugs) gain substantial market share. See Goeschl & Swanson, supra note 4, § 2; Clem Tisdell,
Exploitation of Techniques that Decline in Effectiveness with Use, 37 PUB . FIN . 428, 436 (1982) (“When
there is free or common access to a technique that declines in effectiveness with use, it is likely to be
exploited more quickly than is socially optimal.”). Time-limited EPK is doubly subject to this effect.
75. See Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw., c. 5.
76. The first novel antibiotic in decades was Zyvox/linezolid, introduced into the U.S. market in
April 2000. Sales of Zyvox have escalated globally, becoming one of the best-selling antibiotics in the

16

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:XX

this Article, the patent holder’s proclivity towards short-term and firmbounded thinking when facing rent truncation shall be called waste. Waste is
a negative externality. The global cost may well exceed many tens of billion
dollars per year.77
The evidence of wasting behavior by pharmaceutical firms may be more
anecdotal and intuitive than empirical at the present.78 As a possible example
of waste (in the narrow sense described in this Article), consider Pfizer Inc.’s
recently announced purchase of Vicuron Pharmaceuticals Inc. for $1.9
billion.79 Pfizer owns Diflucan, a former billion dollar-plus blockbuster
antifungal drug that lost patent protection in early 2004.80 Pfizer introduced
a follow-on patented drug, Vfend, but sales have been disappointing.81 Pfizer
is purchasing Vicuron in order to fill its pipeline with profitable drugs to treat
bacterial and fungal infections.82 A major drug in Vicuron’s portfolio is
dalbavancin, an antibiotic which is expected to be approved by the FDA
within a year.83 While best medical practices might shelve dalbavancin for a
long period of time until the social need increases, Pfizer is expected to bring

world. IMS Database, www.imshealth.com (2005) (registration required).
77. If one assumes that marketing by patent holders advances antibiotic resistance by a few years,
the direct cost would be the R&D costs necessary to create the lost population-years of useful therapy.
Given current levels of antibiotic R&D, an order of magnitude estimate would be a few billion dollars per
year. Indirect costs (such as lost Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) from the lack of effective
therapies after resistance) would be many times higher. In 1998, the Institute of Medicine estimated the
U.S. cost of antibiotic resistance at $4 to $5 billion per year. ANTIMICR OBIAL RESISTANCE: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS 1 (Polly F. Harrison & Joshua Lederberg eds., 1998); INST . OF MED ., MICROBIAL THREATS TO
HEALTH: EMERGENCE, DETECTION , AND RESPONSE (Mark S. Smolinski et al. eds., 2003). See generally
Stephanie J. Dancer, The Real Cost of MRSA, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 281-300 (exploring
the direct and indirect costs of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)). Older cost estimates
include $726 million in 1998 dollars (about $1.5 billion in 2004 dollars using IMS U.S. antibiotic sales as
the price inflator) per year in the direct prescription cost for unnecessary antibiotics, Ralph Gonzales et al.,
Excessive Antibiotic Use for Acute Respiratory Infections in the United States, 33 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 757, 757-62 (2001) and the estimated $1.3 billion dollar cost of hospital-acquired bacterial
infections, using data from the early 1990s. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF
ANTIBIOTIC -RESISTANT BACT ERIA , OTA-H-629 (1995), available at http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/
publications.htm.
78. See, e.g., Avorn & Solomon, supra note 10, at 128 for non-empirical descriptions asserting that
“[m]arketing campaigns directed at both physicians and patients further serve to increase demand,
especially for newer, costlier [antibiotic] products.”
79. Gustav Ando, Pfizer Buys Vicuron in U.S. $2 bil. Deal as Fight Against Patent Expirations
Continues, WORLD MKT . ANAL YSIS , June 16, 2005.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the drug to market immediately upon approval.84 One financial reason for
urgency is the patent expiration on Pfizer’s Zithromax/azithromycin.
Zithromax is the best-selling antibiotic in the world in dollar terms and generic
entry is expected shortly. 85 In the 10 years prior to patent expiration, Pfizer’s
U.S. sales of Zithromax have increased steadily, from $104 million in 1994 to
$1.8 billion in 2004.86 Over the same period, Zithromax has increased its
market share among all antibiotics and within its class (macrolides) from
1.32% to 11.43% and from 15.10% to 68.77%, respectively.87 It is apparently
unknown whether the financial success of Zithromax is primarily due to
Pfizer’s marketing, the innate qualities of the drug, or the increased
susceptibility of other macrolides.88 It is clear that bacterial resistance to
macrolides is growing in the United States.89
A second potential example of waste could be one of the newest and most
significant antibiotics, Tygacil/tigecycline. On June 15, 2005, the U.S. FDA
approved Tygacil/tigecycline, the first antibiotic in a new therapeutic class,
glycylcyclines.90 The patent holder, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, faces a difficult
choice between pressures to market Tygacil aggressively and the clinical
demands of global conservation.91 Tigecycline is a novel, wide spectrum

84. See id.
85. Scott Hensley, Pfizer to Buy Infection-drug Maker, WALL ST . J., June 17, 2005, at B5. A Search
of the FDA Orange Book disclosed no unexpired patents or periods of exclusivity for the tablet forms of
Zithromax (azithromycin). See FDA ORANGE BOOK , supra note 24.
86. IMS Database, supra note 76 (year-to-date U.S. market sales data through October 2004).
87. Author’s analysis of IMS data. See id.
88. For a discussion of the major macrolides, see S. Alvarez-Elcoro & M.J. Enzler, The Macrolides:
Erythromycin, Clarithromycin, and Azithromycin, 74 MAYO CLIN . PROC . 613, 613-34 (1999). A June 2005
MedLine search of titles and abstracts for the phrases “advertising or marketing” and “macrolides or
antibiotics” revealed no relevant studies on this question. See Medline Plus, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus.
89. Edward O. Mason, Jr. et al., Macrolide Resistance Among Middle Ear Isolates of Streptococcus
Pneumoniae Observed at Eight United States Pediatric Centers: Prevalence of M and MLSB Phenotypes,
22 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 623-27 (2003) (noting that erythromycin resistance increased from
15% in 1994 to 56% in 2000). Amazingly, U.S. erythromycin sales (in dollar terms) held their own during
this period. IMS Database, supra note 76 (noting that 1994 U.S. sales = $15 million; 2004 U.S. sales =
$17.7 million).
90. For a sample media report, see Marc Kaufman, FDA Approves New Antibiotic for Resistant
Bacteria, WASH . POST , June 17, 2005, at A14. For the official FDA approval, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH , A CATALOG OF FDA APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS , at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label_
ApprovalHistory#apphist (last visited July 10, 2005). Some researchers consider tigecycline to be a
tetracycline derivative, rather than a truly unique class. See, e.g., P.M. Shah, The Need for New
Therapeutic Agents: What is the Pipeline?, 11 CLIN . MICROBIOL. INFECT. 36, 36-42 (Supp. 3, May 2005).
91. For the present, FDA approval has been granted only for the injectable form of Tygacil, which
will limit its marketing potential.
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antibiotic of significant value,92 but Wyeth’s time-limited property right
exposes this novel drug (and indeed the entire class of glycylcyclines) to
waste.93 Wyeth has publicly announced that it views Tygacil as a blockbuster,
with expected peak annual sales of $1 billion.94 Wyeth touts its current best
selling antibiotic as a “workhorse” with expected 2005 annual sales in excess
of $800 million even after patent expiration.95 The best medical approach for
tigecycline might be to hold it completely off the market for many years,
except for true emergency situations where no other drug would work.
Expecting Wyeth to do so voluntarily seems too much; even a perpetual patent
might not be sufficient.
A third potential example is the April 2004 FDA approval of
Ketek/telithromycin, the first antibiotic in a powerful new class known as
ketolides.96 Aventis Pharmaceuticals obtained approval to sell Ketek as a
tablet for respiratory tract infections, a category with a history of inappropriate
prescription patterns.97
Individuals may also waste EPK by inappropriately consuming
antibiotics. Taking the drug might be clinically unnecessary, but third parties
bear much of the cost (financially, clinically, and in terms of resistance), so
neither the physician nor the patient feels the financial effects of their
respective decisions. The direct costs of the therapy and the indirect costs of
increased resistance are quite significant.98

92. A recent review article on tigecycline concluded that it may well be effective against a variety
of resistant gram-positive organisms. M.W. Garrison, J.J. Neumiler & S.M. Setter, Tigecycline: An
Investigational Glycylcycline Antimicrobial with Activity Against Resistant Gram-Positive Organisms, 27
CLIN . THER . 12-22 (2005).
93. As of June 22, 2005, the FDA Orange Book had not yet disclosed Wyeth’s patents on Tygacil.
See FDA ORANGE BOOK , supra note 24.
94. Geno Germano, Executive Vice President, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Presentation at the Deutsche
Bank 30th Annual Health Care Conference 14 (May 3, 2005), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=78193&p=irol-presentations (Wyeth Pharmaceuticals investors relations website)
(last visited June 22, 2005); Groeller, supra note 7 (“Some analysts have predicted that Tygacil could
ultimately mean $1 billion in sales annually to Wyeth.”).
95. Germano, supra note 94, at 12 (referring to Wyeth’s combination IV antibiotic Zosyn
(piperacillin/tazobactam)). The FDA Orange Book discloses no unexpired patents or exclusivity periods
for Zosyn.
See http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/obdetail.cfm?Appl_No=
050684&TABLE1=OB_Rx (last visited June 22, 2005). Sales of Zosyn grew slowly from its introduction
in 1993; U.S. sales first exceeded $200 million in 2001. Since 2000, U.S. sales of Zosyn have increased
more than 167%. IMS Database, supra note 76.
96. Victoria Stagg Elliott, FDA Approves First Ketolide Antibiotic, AMA NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004.
97. Id.
98. The Infectious Diseases Society of America estimates the cost at “billions” and cites the IOM
estimate of “at least $4 billion to $5 billion annually.” BAD BUGS, supra note 1, at 13. See also supra note
62.
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Internalization by drug firms occurs on some scale as pharmaceutical
firms grow larger and hold several antibiotics in their patent portfolios.
Expanding the boundaries of the firm is not a likely solution to the waste
problem unless we are willing to permit a single company to control most or
all global patents for EPK. Imposing Pigovian taxes on drug firms for wasting
EPK has apparently not been attempted. The path taken by the Statute of
Gloucester also remains untrod, although the reversionary interest belongs to
all humanity.
Internalization by consumers is also possible. If consumers faced a tax
for misuse of EPK, then utilization of EPK would likely drop. Eric Kades,
Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School, champions this approach,
which will be critiqued in Section III.A below.
Most of the response to EPK waste has focused on collective action.
Medical societies, hospitals, nursing homes, and public health organizations
issue guidelines encouraging rational antibiotic use. Health care payors
develop formularies,99 academic detailing, 100 and evidence-based medicine
(EBM) guidelines101 to the same effect. Some governments have imposed
increasingly stringent marketing, labeling, and utilization restrictions on
antibiotics and ARVs to delay the onset of resistance.102 These conservation
(collective action) strategies will be discussed in more detail in Section II.D
below.
B. Inadequate Access
The purpose of pharmaceutical appropriation is to reward innovation by
allowing the patent holder to earn patent rents,103 which are extracted by

99. Sandra L. Arnold, Interventions to Improve Antibiotic Prescribing, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES,
supra note 4, at 510-11, 515-16.
100. John Kasprak, West Virginia’s Prescription Drug Academic Detailing Program, OLR RES.
RPT ., Jan. 5, 2005, at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0050.htm.
101. Examples of EBM guidelines for rational antibiotic use include efforts by the Infectious Diseases
Society of America (IDSA) and the British Thoracic Society (BTS). Dilip Nathwani, UK Guidelines:
Methodology and Standards of Care, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 28-29.
102. See WHO, RATIONAL USE OF MEDICINES BY PRESCRIBERS AND PATIENTS, EB115/40, ¶ 19
(Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter RATIONAL USE ]; Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Campaign to
Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings, at www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/
healthcare/default.htm (last updated June 15, 2005); FDA, FDA TASK FORCE ON MICROBIAL RESISTANCE:
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/antimicrobial/
taskforce2000.html (last visited July 10, 2005).
103. I suffer the term patent rents, but the better term would be pharmaceutical appropriation rents,
whether or not derived from patent law.

20

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:XX

establishing prices well above the marginal cost of production. Rent
extraction is best accomplished in high-income populations among people
who can afford expensive patented drugs. In low- and medium-income
populations, financial access to these drugs is a critical issue.104 Patent
domain EPK is exposed to distributional and therapeutic inequities: the
negative externality of inadequate access.105 Public domain EPK is less
subject to this problem because it is free from patent rent extraction.
Access is a serious issue. Many patented pharmaceuticals are available
to high income populations at prices that exceed the annual per capita health
budgets of low- and middle-income countries. If off-patent medications are
equally effective, then perhaps nothing is lost. But when older drugs are no
longer effective106 and the patented drug is clearly the best therapy, denying
access in order to support recovery of R&D costs is cruel and unnecessary.
Cruel because people will die while a lifesaving treatment is possible;
unnecessary because low-income populations would never have contributed
much towards global R&D cost recovery anyway.107 Denying AIDS drugs to
Africa in order to support patent rent extraction is akin to genocide108 for the
widow’s mite.109
Access may also transpose the waste problem articulated above. While
overuse of antibiotics may create a resistance problem in high-income
countries, resistance may be driven more by subtherapeutic dosages due to

104. See RATIONAL USE , supra note 102, ¶ 18; ‘t Hoen, supra note 34, at 1 (2005).
105. The term inadequate access shares some characteristics with deadweight loss, but emphasizes
the distributional and consequential effects of rent extraction and the constrained production inherent in
monopoly pricing. For example, in a standard account of deadweight loss, the deadweight loss might be
small if the monopolist refuses to sell near the marginal cost of production to low-income populations, as
the lost production was small. From the perspective of inadequate access, however, allowing several million
people worldwide to die of AIDS without ARV treatment imposes a tremendous cost, whether or not they
could ever have purchased ARVs at market prices.
106. Four of the top six deadly diseases in Africa have become increasingly resistant to first-line
treatment. Madeline Drexler, Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) in Africa: Smoldering in the Shadows, 20
APUA NEWSL . No. 4 (Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics, Boston, Mass.), 2002, at 1.
107. F.M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD ECON . 1127,
1141 (2004) (proposing reduction of pharmaceutical appropriation in low-income countries); KEVIN
OUTTERSON, NONRIVAL ACCESS TO PHARM ACEUT ICAL KNOWLEDGE (submission to the WHO Comm’n on
Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation & Pub. Health, Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/submissions/KevinOutterson3january.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005) [hereinafter
NONRIV AL ACCESS ].
108. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The International Information Society, 24 LOY . L.A. ENT . L. REV . 33,
34-37 (2004).
109. Mark 12:41-44; Luke 21:2-4.
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poverty in low-income countries.110 Spotty access may accelerate resistance
while a stable supply chain will have the opposite effect.
The human and economic costs of inadequate access are staggering,
shattering the fragile economies of many countries and the lives of hundreds
of millions of people. Estimates of the cost of this externality range in the
tens of billions of dollars in high-income countries,111 and are much higher, as
a percentage of GDP, in low- and medium-income countries.112
Some pharmaceutical companies have responded to the AIDS treatment
crisis by establishing voluntary differential pricing regimes in certain low- and
medium-income populations. While laudable, these programs are limited to
particular diseases, drugs, or populations. Voluntary differential prices are not
nearly low enough and are not generally priced at the lowest possible marginal
cost.113 Even at the lowest marginal cost, a lifesaving drug regime offered at
the marginal cost of production might still be out of reach from the
perspective of a low-income patient. An annual supply of the highly effective
anti-AIDS FDC drug Triomune at $240 per year may still be too expensive in
Malawi.114 Such patients are unable to internalize the benefits of the therapy
due to extreme poverty and require a Pigovian subsidy.
The patent rent extractor (such as GlaxoSmithKline) has no economic
incentive to engage in widespread marginal cost pricing for the world’s lowand medium-income populations. Establishing a few programs might bolster
public relations, but pharmaceutical companies have no internalized economic
incentive to systematically address inadequate access. In some cases,
companies refuse to participate in these access programs. In 2004, Bayer
successfully lobbied Canada to exclude Bayer’s antibiotic Avelox/vigamox

110. Cf. Denis K. Byarugaba, Antimicrobial Resistance and its Containment in Developing
Countries, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 618, 633-35 (noting that subtherapeutic dosages due
to patent poverty or supply chain instability are likely to speed resistance).
111. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost? Evidence from the
1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 241, 241-51 (2001) (concluding that increased drug utilization in the
U.S. would save billions of dollars, one possible measure of the negative externality of inadequate access
in the U.S.).
112. The global cost of inadequate access to health is certainly many hundreds of billions of dollars
per year. WHO, COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECO NO MIC
DEVELOPMENT 103-08 (2001) (calculating the positive economic benefits of improved health access in
developing countries as $360 billion per year in 2015 to 2020) [hereinafter WHO, COMMISSION ON
MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH]. Some portion of that cost could be apportioned to inadequate access
to patented pharmaceuticals. Evidence from the AIDS treatment crisis globally suggests the amount would
be significant. See Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 251-55; ‘t Hoen, supra note 28, at 29-30.
113. NONRIV AL ACCESS , supra note 107, ¶ 8.
114. See discussion infra section II.D.2 concerning Triomune.
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(moxifloxacin)115 from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha process
for export to low-income countries.116 Avelox treats pneumonia, a major
cause of death worldwide. Avelox was excluded despite the fact that it had
many years of patent life remaining117 and that sales of licensed Avelox
outside of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) are very modest. Total sales of licensed Avelox in Latin America in
2004 were $4,000.118
If Pigovian taxes were imposed on drug firms to help them internalize the
cost of inadequate access, the amount would be in order of tens of billions of
dollars per year.119 The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health called
for additional global donor investments in health within this range.120 If
indeed the inadequate access negative externality ranges in the tens of billions
of dollars per year, then the Pigovian tax would need to be equally significant
and would prompt dramatic global action. This Pigovian tax should be
imposed only on those pharmaceutical companies which did not participate in
effective programs to provide access to medicines. A Pigovian tax of this
magnitude and purpose would be a radical move for global public health.
Alternatively, the drug firm externality may be addressed through compulsory
licensing and mandatory differential pricing programs to ensure therapeutic
access.121

115. Bayer uses two brand names for moxifloxacin: Avelox in tablet and injectable forms and
Vigamox in opthalmic drops.
116. See ‘t Hoen, supra note 34, at 5.
117. The FDA Orange Book lists three patents for moxifloxacin, with expirations on June 30, 2009,
March 4, 2014, and December 5, 2016. FDA ORANGE BOOK , supra note 24.
118. IMS data reports that for the annual period ending October 2004, U.S. sales of Avelox were $231
million, while Latin American sales were only $4,000. No sales were reported by IMS in French West
Africa. See IMS Database, supra note 76. Bayer would not have lost much revenue if it had agreed to
place Avelox on the Canadian list.
119. The global cost of inadequate access to health is certainly many hundreds of billions of dollars
per year. WHO, COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, supra note 112, at 103-08 (calculating
the positive economic benefits of improved health access in developing countries as $360 billion per year
in 2015 to 2020). Some portion of that cost could be apportioned to inadequate access to patented
pharmaceuticals. Evidence from the AIDS treatment crisis globally suggests the amount would be
significant. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 251-55.
120. WHO, COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, supra note 112, at 11 (stating that
donors should commit an additional $35 billion per year by 2007 for all global health needs).
121. For an extended discussion of these issues, see Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at
223-30.
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C. Balancing Consumer Surplus, Access, and Innovation
Lifesaving drugs greatly benefit society.
To the extent that
pharmaceutical companies do not capture all consumer surplus created by
antibiotic therapies, the public enjoys a positive externality of consumer
surplus: better health at a bargain price. The public also benefits when
treated individuals are less likely to transmit infection to others, an
epidemiological effect. Frank Lichtenberg has estimated the unappropriated
consumer surplus for patented drugs in the United States to be in the range of
tens of billions of dollars or more per year.122
Research and development is quite possibly another positive
externality.123 The firm that invests in R&D may reap appropriated rewards
through the patent system, but is unlikely to capture all of the societal benefits.
Nor should it; complete appropriation would exacerbate the access and anticommons (congestion) effects of IP rights.124
Unappropriated consumer surplus creates a potential drag on innovation.
If all of the consumer surplus could be captured by drug companies through
perfect price discrimination, then additional funds would be available for
R&D. Put another way, encouraging drug companies to raise prices shifts
funds from consumer surplus to drug company operating margins. Allowing
drug companies to capture an additional dollar of consumer surplus might
result in 8 to 33 cents of additional R&D expenditures.125 Conversely,
improving access through price controls may well reduce R&D
expenditures,126 although this effect has not been verified empirically.127

122. See supra note 76.
123. If R&D expenditures are already socially supra-optimal, then marginal R&D generates negative
externalities. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 220.
124. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 698 (anti-commons); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER , THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC TUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003) (congestion).
125. Light (2004) (low estimate); Vernon, et al (2004) (high estimate).
126. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP ’T OF COMMERCE, PHARMACEU TICAL PRICE
CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING , RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, AND INNOVATION 25-31 (Dec. 2004). This report was the subject of a hearing in the U.S.
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions on February 17, 2005. Four of the persons
testifying were selected by the Republican leadership and were favorable towards the Report. For the sole
dissenting voice, see Drug Importation: Would the Price Be Right?: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Kevin Outterson, Assoc. Professor
of Law, West Virginia Univ.), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/testimony/t199_tes.html (last visited
July 10, 2005).
127. NEED CITE
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Policymakers commonly assume that increasing biomedical R&D
expenditures is an unalloyed public good.128 However, we should not assume
that increasing R&D expenditures at the cost of consumer surplus or access
is socially beneficial. R&D policy must consider both the costs and the
benefits of an incremental unit of R&D. The public policy goal should be to
achieve the socially optimal amount of biomedical R&D, rather than
maximizing R&D at all costs.
We have several reasons to be skeptical of the IP maximalist agenda.
Taken to its extreme, maximizing IP would condemn generic drug entry
altogether, making pharmaceutical patents perpetual.129 However, additional
R&D expenditures may offer declining marginal returns, at least in “normal”
science.130 If global EPK is finite like fossil fuels, then additional resources
for EPK drug discovery may be wasted and could be better spent on
conservation and other research targets.131 In any case, society’s expenditures
for drug R&D may already be supra-optimal and resources could be directed
elsewhere.132 Finally, the inefficiency of the additional incentive is great (at
best, only a third of the captured consumer surplus might result in R&D
expenditures). Proposals to maximize biomedical R&D by strengthening IP
rights should be scrutinized as possible industry rent-seeking rather than sound
public policy. 133 Other alternatives such as R&D prizes,134 patent buyouts,135

128. NEED CITE
129. Consumer surplus expands following patent expiration if prices fall. Thus the process of generic
entry (and the Hatch-Waxman compromise generally) is inconsistent with an IP maximalist approach.
130. THOMAS S. KUHN , THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1986). Large
pharmaceutical companies operate primarily in normal science; small biotechnology firms and academic
researchers are more likely to pursue new research paradigms. Adjusting the systems to encourage more
breakthrough research will have to be saved for another day, but for an interesting thesis, see Peter Lee,
Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 662-63 (2004)
(describing how patents raise costs in normal science, encouraging revolutionary science).
131. See infra Section I.B (last 2 paragraphs).
132. Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market, 23 HEALTH
AFF. 107, 111-12 (2004); Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 220-22.
133. Farlow (2005).
134. Michael Kremer, Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part I: Rationale & Part II: Design
Issues, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 35-109 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Kremer, Creating Markets].
135. See Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor
Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, 24 WORLD ECON . 779, 788 (2001).
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and the proposed R&D Treaty136 might be more efficient while avoiding the
aforementioned access problems.137
One prominent proposal along these lines is the Hubbard-Love
Pharmaceutical R&D Treaty,138 which does not rely on retail sales to
accomplish R&D cost recovery. Instead, each country’s contributions to
global pharmaceutical R&D are compared against an agreed norm. Free riders
will pay a tax. Those countries carrying more than their fair share will receive
a subsidy.
The Hubbard-Love R&D Treaty not only resolves the free rider issue, but
also the negative externality of inadequate access. When R&D cost recovery
is decoupled from retail sales, sales to consumers may be made at the marginal
cost of production without affecting innovation. The incentive to counterfeit
pharmaceuticals also diminishes greatly under this approach.139
A broadly similar but more limited approach is patent buyouts for the
public domain, by which a donor government or foundation purchases the
patent to a drug and donates it to the public domain or holds it for public
use.140 Paying market value for the patent protects innovation. Entering the
public domain resolves access issues by removing patent rent extraction and
enabling marginal cost production by generic companies.

136. Tim Hubbard, Alternatives to the Price System, Presentation at Columbia University (Dec. 4,
2003), at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/hubbard.ppt (last visited July 10, 2005);
James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, Presentation at Columbia University
(Dec. 4, 2003), at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/love_000.pdf (last visited
July 10, 2005).
137. See James Love, From TRIPS to RIPS: A Better Trade Framework to Support Innovation in
Medical Technologies (Workshop on Economic Issues Related to Access to HIV/AIDS Care in Developing
Countries, Université de la Méditerranée, Marseille, France, May 27, 2003); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient
Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (draft dated Jan. 17, 2005), available at
http://econ.ucalgary.ca/hollis.htm; Dean Baker & Noriko Chatani, Promoting Goods Ideas on Drugs: Are
Patents the Best Way? The Relative Efficiency of Patent and Public Support for Bio-Medical Research
(CEPR Research Report, Oct. 11, 2002), available at www.cepr.org.
138. Hubbard, supra note 136; Love, supra note 136.
139. KEVIN OUTTERSON, RESOLVING DYSFUN CTIONAL PHARM ACEUT ICAL ARBITRAGE AND
COU NTERF EIT DRUGS THROUGH THE PROPOSED PHARM ACEUT ICAL R&D TREATY (submission to the WHO
Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation & Pub. Health, Nov. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/en/pharma_arbitrage.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005).
140. NONRIVAL ACCESS , supra note 107, at 2. In a hybrid approach, the patent could be bought out
and donated to the public domain only for non-OECD countries at a much reduced price. The rich OECD
countries would be left with the current patent-based system. This hybrid addresses most of the access
issues globally, allowing marginal cost production for most of the world, while not disturbing 90% or more
of the profits of pharmaceutical companies.
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Another coordination approach creates prizes for pharmaceutical
innovation.141 Professor Kremer’s prize proposals are focused more
particularly on neglected diseases. Prizes may offer rewards for intermediate
steps short of a patent and may utilize a product purchase commitment rather
than a patent buy-out. Kremer’s proposals primarily address inadequate
incentives to undertake particular types of R&D, but they can also function to
coordinate free riding and promote access.
Each of these coordination mechanisms focus on the supply side of the
EPK problem. 142 We now turn to the demand side, conserving EPK for its
highest and best uses.
D. Conserving EPK in the Public and Patent Domains
As legal support for appropriation falls away over time, EPK loses the
characteristic of appropriability and gradually passes into the public domain.
Indeed, this was the intent of the disclosure aspect of the patent bargain.
Public domain EPK is rivalrous and exposed to common pool resource
problems. The need to manage EPK was quickly recognized by Professor
Alexander Fleming as early as 1946.143
The size and scope of this conservation problem is an inverse function of
waste: to the extent that EPK has been wasted during the patent domain, less
will be exposed to common pool rivalry. On the other hand, if patent domain
waste has been minimized due to careful conservation,144 the value of the
public domain resource increases. Success in one domain increases the stakes
and the need to protect EPK in the other. The following sections discuss some
of the salient features of EPK conservation.

141. Kremer, Creating Markets, supra note 134, at 35-36.
142. Innovation and access are supply issues, as opposed to management and conservation of
demand.
143. See Ian Phillips, Antibiotic Policies—A Historical Perspective, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra
note 4, at 1-4 (noting that hospitals were quick to implement programs to constrain resistance and citing
Sir Alexander Fleming, History and Development of Penicillin, in PENICILLIN , ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION
1-23 (Sir Alexander Fleming ed., 1946)).
144. The research on which conservation techniques are most effective is quite unsatisfactory. In a
major review of all published studies, no clear conclusions could be reached on the best conservation
strategies, or even whether any strategy was effective in combating resistance in the community.
ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 518-19.
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1. Global EPK Conservation
Conservation of EPK may require global coordination between many
states in a globalized world.145 States which carefully manage antibiotic use
incur all of the program and clinical costs; however, some of the benefits are
global, a positive externality for which the state is not compensated.
Conversely, a state that is unable or unwilling to implement strict conservation
regimes146 may export antibiotic resistance to its neighbors and the globe
without bearing the full weight of the consequences.147 This is the
conservation problem of globalization, suggesting that EPK should be
managed at the global level, much as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) established a global floor for IP
appropriation.148 The WHO has taken several steps to encourage EPK
conservation.149 The European Antibiotic Policy calls for subsidizing efforts
in low-income countries to reduce resistance.150
The global dimension of EPK may be overstated. The popular press
abounds in stories about potential global pandemics such as SARS. One
might infer from these discussions that resistance spreads uniformly and
internationally. While disease certainly moves around the globe, we should
not over-emphasize the global movement of resistance. Resistance retains
significant individual, local, and regional variances.151 These variances may
145. Richard D. Smith & Joanna Coast, Antimicrobial Resistance: A Global Response, 80 BULL .
WHO 126 (2002).
146. For a discussion of the implementation of antibiotic policies in developing countries, see Anibal
Sosa, Antibiotic Policies in Developing Countries, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 602-04. Given
the lack of pharmacy infrastructure in many countries, effective surveillance and control of antibiotic
prescribing is difficult. Id. at 606-11.
147. In both examples, some of the costs and benefits are internalized locally. While antibiotic
resistance does spread geographically, resistance may vary dramatically between different regions and
institutions. At least some of this variance is attributed to local conservation decisions. LEVY , supra note
1, at 152, 157-58, 301-02.
148. TRIPS is a move towards global standardization of IP law. Countries retain some flexibility,
but in practice this flexibility are frequently waived, particularly by poorer countries. THORPE , supra note
66, at 1.
149. See, e.g., RATIONAL USE , supra note 102.
150. E. Keuleyan & I.M. Gould, European Study Group on Antibiotic Policy (ESGAP), Key Issues
in Developing Antibiotic Policies: From an Institutional Level to Europe-Wide, 7 CLIN . MICROBIOL.
INFECT. 16-21 (Supp. 6, 2001).
151. Livermore, supra note 4, at s15-s16; Albrich Werner et al., Antibiotic Selection Pressure and
Resistance in Steptococcus Pneumoniae and Streptococcus Pyogenes, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
514, 515 (2004) (“We found large differences in resistance rates, even in neighboring countries. A variety
of factors are responsible. . . .”); James A. Karlowsky et al., Factors Associated with Relative Rates of
OF THE
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result from environmental differences, conservation strategies, or exogenous
factors like the frequency of indwelling lines as vectors for infection.
Resistance is most prevalent in emerging upper middle-income countries.152
Resistance may also arise multifocally, developing more or less independently
in multiple settings.153 Negative externalities may be entirely local (within a
hospital ICU)154 or regional (within a community) rather than global. To the
extent that any of these conditions hold true, coordination can be partially
successful at the local, regional and domestic levels, even absent effective
global coordination. In December 2004, the WHO reported that most
countries still fail to utilize effective conservation tools at the domestic and
local levels,155 so much work remains to be done. Nevertheless, many aspects
of EPK are global public goods requiring global coordination for best
results.156
2. Conservation Within Therapeutic Classes
The biology of resistance pays no attention to the patent doctrines of
scope or inventive step,157 but these doctrines may affect EPK biology.
Resistance may develop against a particular mode of action rather than to a
specific patented molecule.158 This biological reality creates negative
externalities and coordination problems between drugs which share a common

Antimicrobial Resistance Among Streptococcus Pneumoniae in the United States: Results from the TRUST
Surveillance Program (1998-2002), 36 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 966-68 (2003) (noting statistically
significant regional variations in resistance to penicillin, azithromycin, TMP-SMX, and ceftriaxone across
the United States); E. Perez-Trallero et al., Geographical and Ecological Analysis of Resistance,
Coresistance, and Coupled Resistance to Antimicrobials in Respiratory Pathogenic Bacteria in Spain, 49
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENT S & CHEMOTHERAPY 1965-72 (2005) (“We highlight the importance of differential
geographical frequencies of coresistance . . . and coupled resistance . . . probably resulting from different
local coselective events.”).
152. Society’s success in treating other conditions results in an increased population with
compromised immune systems more prone to opportunistic infections.
153. Livermore, supra note 4, at s12-s13.
154. See, e.g., O. Leroy et al., Hospital-Acquired Pneumonia in Critically Ill Patients: Factors
Associated With Episodes Due to Imipenem-Resistant Organisms, 33 INFECTION 129, 129-35 (June 2005)
(suggesting factors to control hospital-acquired infection of resistant microbes).
155. RATIONAL USE , supra note 102, ¶ 9.
156. Smith & Coast, supra note 145, at 127-30.
157. The same might be said of our students.
158. Examples of the development of cross-resistance within a therapeutic class include
fluoroquinolones.
Jerome J. Schentag & Alan Forrest, Roles for Pharmacokinetics and
Pharmacodynamics, in THE RESISTANCE PHENOMENON IN MICROBES AND INFEC TIOUS DISEASE VECTORS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN HEALTH AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTAINMENT 181 (Stacey L. Knobler et al. eds.,
2003).
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mode of action, that is, within therapeutic classes.159 A major example of
cross-resistance within a therapeutic class is the Non-Nucleoside Reverse
Transcriptase Inhibitor (NNRTI) class of ARVs for AIDS.160
Drug companies introducing a new antibiotic class face strong incentives
to maximize sales of the new class, to the detriment of subsequent drugs in the
class.161 Unconstrained appropriation will be fleeting and certainly much
shorter than the patent period.162 The first mover also benefits if the prior
classes have become ineffective.163 The best medical conservation for global
public health may well require the opposite tactic: prolong the usefulness of
the older classes, while holding the new class off the market, in reserve. Joint
coordination amongst patent owners within a class might conceivably address
this issue, given a waiver from competition laws. This waiver would
necessarily permit rival firms within a class to jointly control both supply and
price.
A further complication arises when one or more drugs in a therapeutic
class are off-patent. Once the first member of a class enters the public
domain, all remaining owners are exposed to enhanced common pool rivalry,
and are thereby tempted to waste. This remains true even if other drugs in the
class retain many years of patent protection. With one or more drugs in the
public domain, private coordination cannot work, for there is no barrier to
entry by a non-conforming and profit-maximizing generic producer. Public

159. Therapeutic classes generally mean the categories by which pharmaceuticals are grouped,
generally based upon the structure of the molecule, the therapeutic target, or the mode of action. For
example, antibiotics are classed based upon whether their mode of action is DNA inhibition, RNA
inhibition, cell wall, or protein synthesis. In lipid-lowering medications, statins have a similar mode of
action. In NSAIDS, the Cox-2 inhibitors such as Celebrex or Vioxx share a mode of action. Within a
particular class, many drugs may reach the market, very frequently with different patent holders. For a
discussion of the economics of follow-on innovation within drug classes (the so-called “me too” drugs), see
generally JOSEPH DIMASI & CHERIE PAQUETTE , THE ECONOMICS OF FOLLOW-ON DRUG RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT: TREND S IN ENTRY RATES AND TIMING OF DEVELOPMENT (Submission to the WHO
Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation & Pub. Health, Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.
who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/Submission_DiMasi.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005).
160. See, e.g., V. Joly, D. Descamps & P. Yeni, NNRTI Plus PI Combinations in the Perspective of
Nucleoside-Sparing or Nucleoside-Failing Antiretroviral Regimes, 4 AIDS REV . 128-39 (July-Sept. 2002)
(describing the large degree of cross-resistance within the 3 available NNRTI drugs); Clotet, supra note 33,
at 123-30 (“Resistance to one drug often result[s] in cross-resistance to many, if not all, others in the same
[ARV] class.”); see also Mocroft et al., supra note 33, at 201-09 (“The roles of cross-resistance and
adherence in response to second-line regimens needs further investigation.”).
161. NEED CITE
162. The average time before a second member of a therapeutic class is marketed is about 1.2 years.
DIMASI & PAQUETTE , supra note 159, at 5.
163. Joint ownership across classes would address this problem but would require a single firm to
own all members of both classes.
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conservation is required when a vulnerable class of EPK simultaneously
resides in both public and patent domains.164 Class resistance also affects
future members of the class in the drug development pipeline,165 extending the
problem back to the private domain.
A patent-based approach to these issues might grant a very broad patent
right for the entire drug class to the first applicant. The first to patent a new
target or mode of action would control the licensing of downstream
innovation, and thus manage the class. A single firm would control all EPK
within a therapeutic class and generic entry would be forbidden.
3. Conservation between Therapeutic Classes
Class-based resistance problems are further magnified when some
resistance traits are transmitted across classes. For example, prolonged use
of a single antibiotic has stimulated the emergence of antibiotics-resistant
bacteria from different classes that were not used in treatment. This effect has
been observed in the widely-used ciprofloxacin.166 In another experiment,
resistance crossed three classes with prolonged use of a single drug.167 In
Iceland, use of macrolides and co-trimoxazoles selected for penicillin
resistance more aggressively than penicillin itself by a factor of three or
four.168 Cross-class resistance appears between some classes (ß-lactams,
macrolides, and TMP-SMX), but nonfluoroquinolone use does not apparently
create cross-resistance among Streptococcus pneumoniae with levofloxacin
(an oral fluoroquinolone).169 Exposure of Pseudomonas aeruginosa to
antibiotics from two different classes created cross-class resistance in one
direction but not in the other.170 If transmission of resistance across classes

164. While class patents would resolve common pool rivalry amongst private parties, it would not
address waste as the class patent approached expiration. In any case, public conservation would be
necessary once the EPK entered the public domain.
165. LEVY , supra note 1, at 221-23.
166. “Even more surprising, the resistances were not limited to naturally occurring antibiotics, but
also to the newer synthetic antimicrobials, the fluoroquinolones, such as norfloxacin and ciprofloxacin.”
Id. at 110-11, 219-20.
167. In one experiment, feeding oxytetracycline to chickens led to the appearance of E. coli “with
resistance not only to tetracycline, but also to ampicillin, streptomycin, and sulfonamides, even though the
chickens had never been fed these drugs.” Id. at 163.
168. Ian M. Gould, Antibiotic Use—Ecological Issues and Required Actions, in ANTIBIOTIC
POLICIES, supra note 4, at 705 (citing Karl G. Kristinnson, Modification of Prescribers’ Behavior: The
Icelandic Approach, 5 CLIN . MICROBIOL. INFECT. 4S43, 4S43-47 (1999)).
169. Karlowsky et al., supra note 151, at 969.
170. The antibiotics were ciprofloxacin (a fluoroquinolone) and cefepime (a cephalosporin).

2005]

RUNNING HEAD

31

is significant, then all susceptible classes might require joint coordination or
conservation. If private ordering remained the mechanism of coordination,
patent scope or waivers of antitrust law would have to expand greatly. At
some point, the effort becomes a government-supported antibiotic cartel rather
than a free market.
A related effect occurs when patents for the components of a combination
therapy are held by different companies. Fixed-Dose Combination (FDC)
drugs for HIV combine multiple classes of drugs in a single pill. FDCs
improve patient compliance and may delay resistance.171 Triomune is Cipla’s
brand name for a very important triple-drug therapy FDC for sub-Saharan
Africa, containing nevirapine (NVP), stavudine (d4T), and lamivudine
(3TC).172 Triomune is produced as an unlicensed generic and sold for sixtyseven cents per day or US$244 per year.173 As of June 2005, Triomune was
not available in a licensed FDC form, a rare inversion in which a generic
company is a sole-source supplier.174 The patents for nevirapine, stavudine,
and lamivudine are held by different companies,175 and they are apparently
unable to conclude a cross-licensing agreement. FDCs are important in other
therapeutic areas as well. Combination drugs in Directly-Observed Treatment,

Exposure to only ciprofloxacin resulted in resistance to both drugs; exposure to only cefepime selected for
cefepime resistance, but did not result in ciprofloxacin resistance in this organism. S.A. Alyaseen et al.,
Selection of Cross-Resistance Following Exposure of Pseudomonas aeruginosa Clinical Isolates to
Ciprofloxacin or Cefepime, 49 ANTIMICR OBIAL AGENT S & CHEMOTHERAPY 2543, 2543-45 (2005).
171. See, e.g., Christian Laurent et al., Effectiveness and Safety of a Generic Fixed-Dose
Combination of Nevirapine, Stavudine, and Lamivudine in HIV-1-Infected Adults in Cameroon: OpenLabel Multicentre Trial, 364 THE LANCET 29, 29-34 (July 3, 2004); Gregory K. Robbins et al., Comparison
of Sequential Three-Drug Regimens as Initial Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG . J. MED . 2293
(Dec. 11, 2003); Robert W. Shafer et al., Comparison of Four-Drug Regimens and Pairs of Sequential
Three-Drug Regimens as Initial Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG . J. MED . 2304 (Dec. 11, 2003).
The U.S. government agrees. See U.S. DEP ’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED
REGARDING PRINCIPLES FOR FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION DRUG PRODUCTS (Apr. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040408b.html (last visited July 8, 2004).
Different
combinations of ARVs should be available in order to minimize resistance. Joly, Descamps & Yeni, supra
note 160, at 128 (“Such combinations should not be used in patients infected with HIV-1 group O HIV-2,
due to the natural resistance to NNRTI of these subtypes.”). This also underscores the need for genotyping
diagnostics on the patient prior to initiation of HAART. Clotet, supra note 33, at 123-30.
172. NEED CITE
173. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF
ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15 (6th ed. 2004).
174. ‘t Hoen, supra note 34, at 2 (recommending FDCs blocked by patents); UNICEF-UNAIDSWHO-MSF, SOURCES AND PRICES OF SELECTED MEDICINES AND DIAGNOSTICS FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH
HIV/AIDS 11 (2003) (NVP + D4T + 3TC fixed dose combination not available in the U.S.), available at
http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/parl/ipc/sources-prices.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005).
As of June 2005, the name-brand FDC is still not available.
175. FDA ORANGE BOOK , supra note 24.

32

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:XX

Short-course (DOTS) represent the current best practice for treatment of
resistant strains of tuberculosis, and FDC anti-malarial drugs (specifically,
Fixed-Dose Artesunate Combination Therapy, or FACT) are currently the best
first-line and prophylactic treatments.176 While some ARVs demonstrate
strong susceptibility to cross-resistance within a class,177 resistance between
classes appears to be less of a problem. 178
Private ordering requires all patents in a FDC to be held by a single firm
(as it is with Novartis’s anti-malarial drug Coartem (artemether/
lamefantrine)), but single firm ownership is unlikely for FDCs for AIDS, with
key patents spread amongst several companies. Private firms might crosslicense to permit FDC production. However, the failure over many years to
cross-license patented ARVs, in the face of the most pressing global
catastrophe,179 suggests that transaction costs are much higher than Coase
would have hoped.180 If private ordering is insufficient, public action will be
required.
4. Conservation and Market Entry
New antibiotics enter the U.S. market after FDA approval. With the
patent clock ticking,181 companies have every incentive to speed along the

176. WHO, ACCESS TO ARTE MISIN IN -BASED COMBINATION ANTIMALAR IAL DRUGS OF ACCEPT ABLE
QUALITY (2d ed. Apr. 26, 2004), available at http://mednet3.who.int/prequal/mal/mal.supplies/pdf (last
visited July 10, 2005). The Artemether/lumefantrine FDC is manufactured by Novartis. For a description
of the effort to create FDCs for malaria in Africa and Latin America, see Press Release, Drugs for Neglected
Diseases Initiative (DNDI), Malaria Patients Enter DNDi Clinical Trials (July 2, 2004), at http://www.
dndi.org/ (last visited July 10, 2005), and DNDi, “FACT” Sheet, at http://www.dndi.org/ (last visited
July 18, 2005). FACT therapy is also important for delaying the emergence of an artemisinins-resistant
mutation of Plasmodium falciparum. A single mutation could render the malaria parasite no longer
susceptible to artemisinins. A.C. Uhlemann et al., A Single Amino Acid Residue Can Determine the
Sensitivity of SERCAs to Artemisianins, NAT . STRUCT. MOL. BIOL. (June 5, 2005) (electronically published
ahead of print edition), available at PubMed Id: 15937493. For a recent news story on tuberculosis
resistance, see Chase, supra note 40.
177. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
178. Roge et al., supra note 33, at 38-47 (noting that second-line treatment worked despite the
presence of primary resistance mutations).
179. ‘t Hoen, supra note 34, at 2.
180. Coase famously postulated that if transaction costs were zero, then externalities could be
resolved without regard to whom liability fell. With zero transaction costs, if the failure to produce a FDC
created a negative externality, then an efficient license agreement would be concluded to address the
externality. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON . 1-44 (1960).
181. The Hatch-Waxman Act restores some, but not all, of the lost patent time due to the FDA
approval process. 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A, 156 (2000). One suggestion being floated by PhRMA is to
restore all of the FDA approval time for antibiotics. David M. Cocchetto, Regulatory and Other Incentives

2005]

RUNNING HEAD

33

approval process. Once approved for marketing, the remaining patent period
is adjusted per the Hatch-Waxman Act,182 and the company begins sales and
marketing. Indeed, most firms prepare assiduously for marketing approval and
hit the ground running as soon as possible. For innovative products which are
safe and effective, speedy marketing is clearly in the public interest.183
But for some EPK, immediate marketing of the drug may not be in the
social interest. Perhaps it should be saved for later or offered only in narrowly
defined circumstances.184 EPK is unique in that the public may not benefit
from the speedy uptake of an innovative, safe, and effective drug. When the
first novel antibiotic in many years, Zyvox/linezolid, was introduced in April
2000, sales skyrocketed to over $345 million per year in the U.S., with
significant sales across the globe as well.185 Social welfare might have called
for a delayed introduction of Zyvox/linezolid, or for a less effective marketing
campaign.
This Article has already explored similar issues with
Tygacil/tigecycline, Zithromax/azithromycin and dalbavancin.186
5. Conservation and Innovation
Public regulation creates a tension with innovation. When market entry
is delayed, or drug use managed to reduce demand, antibiotic sales are
depressed.187 Absent other adjustments, conservation during the patent
domain weakens appropriation and, thus, the financial incentive to innovate.
After patent expiration, this particular problem disappears, but is replaced
by another innovation problem. Effective conservation of public domain EPK
dampens the need for new antibiotics by keeping the old ones useful. Public
conservation of EPK creates static gains (maximizing the usefulness of
today’s drugs), but presents apparent dynamic losses (future drug innovation

for Antibiotic Development, in CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATIO N AND RESEARCH , IDSA/PH RMA/FDA
WORKING GROUP MEETING , at slides 2-4, 6, 17 (Nov. 19-20, 2002), available at www.fda.gov/
cder/present/idsaphrma/default.htm (visited Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter PH RMA WORKING GROUP].
182. Drug Price Competition and Patent Law Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman
Act].
183. If one assumes the NDRA has correctly found safety and efficacy, generally speedy marketing
is desired by all parties. Public and private objectives frequently diverge during the drug approval process
on these issues of safety and efficacy.
184. See infra Section II.D.6.
185. IMS Database, supra note 76.
186. See supra note ___. NEED CITE
187. Many have made this observation. For a recent discussion, see Paul H. Rubin, The FDA’s
Antibiotic Resistance, 27 REG . 34-36 (2005).
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is hindered). In reality, these innovation losses may not account for much
because these new drugs were not needed yet. In this scenario, the older drugs
are still effective. Postponing discovery of new antibiotics might be the best
course so long as the present drugs are better managed. This is especially true
if global EPK is a finite resource, as described in Section I.B above.
6. Biological Complexity May Require Divergent Conservation Models
Simple models of antibiotic innovation are challenged by biological
complexity. Microbes develop resistance in many ways with significantly
different biological expressions.188 As a result, diverse arrays of conservation
responses are required,189 including some that work at cross purposes.
Some microbes are best managed with a sequence of drugs: exhausting
one antibiotic at a time, whilst holding all others in reserve. For others, FDC
therapy might be better suited.190 For some antibiotics, exhaustion is
progressive but recovery and renewal is possible at some thresholds if the
antibiotic is rested.191 Others appear to lose effectiveness over time, even
without widespread use.192 For the last two groups of drugs, one might want
extraordinarily tight control early on. If recovery is possible, the drug could
be pulled from the market when certain thresholds are reached; for the others,
perhaps the threshold triggers a high-use period (the “blowout”).193 Yet
another strategy would be indicated if a particular microbial population can

188. Livermore, supra note 4, at s11; Ian M. Gould, Antibiotic Use—Ecological Issues and Actions,
in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 704-08.
189. Laxminarayan, On the Economics of Resistance, in BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra note 25, at
4-7; Marc Lipsitch & Bruce A. Levin, The Population Dynamics of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy, 41
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENT S & CHEMOTHERAPY 363, 371 (1997) (providing examples of simplifying
assumptions in a mathematical model of resistance); Tisdell, supra note 74, at 430.
190. See, e.g., PUJARI ET AL., supra note 5, at 100 (“HAART delivered at FDCs has shown potent and
durable effect amongst HIV-infected patients in this clinical study.”). The U.S. guidelines are at
http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/guidelines/ (last visited July 10, 2005).
191. See LEVY , supra note 1, at 216-17. For many antibiotics (other than ciprofloxacin), E. coli
resistance is temporary and fades within a month. Shannon D. Putnam et al., Postreatment Changes in
Escherichia coli Antimicrobial Susceptibility Rates Among Diarrheic Patients Treated With Ciprofloxacin,
49 ANTIMICR OBIAL AGENT S & CHEMOTHERAPY 2571-72 (2005) (after treatment with ciprofloxacin, “rates
of resistance against multiple antibiotics increased dramatically from baseline to day 7 and then tapered off
to return to pretreatment levels by day 28, except for ciprofloxacin, suggesting that population accumulative
usage of fluoroquinolones may result in an incremental increase in resistance rates”). Kades takes a strong
stand that EPK is finite (like minerals) rather than renewable (like fisheries), much stronger than may be
justified by the complex biological evidence.
192. See Kades, supra note 44, 662-65.
193. Goeschl & Swanson, supra note 4, at ___. NEED PINPOINT
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be reduced so drastically that it will not recover. Some multiple drug resistant
strains are quite mobile globally and require global coordination, while others
are geographically specific and can be addressed on institutional, local, and
regional levels.194 Alternative strategies are appropriate depending upon the
biological response to incremental versus substantial antibiotic innovation.195
In short, epidemiological models of resistance are frequently pathogenspecific and context-dependent. Economic and legal models frequently are
not. Microbial life and its adaptive responses are exceedingly diverse, and
increasingly complex.196 In light of such complexity, we should be surprised
if a single model of conservation or innovation suited all EPK cases.
The present Article does not map out these myriad possibilities; the
underlying science is woefully incomplete.197 It merely serves up a warning
that a single model is unlikely to address all of the challenges inherent in
biological complexity.
III. PRESERVING THE PUBLIC DOM AIN : A CRITIQUE OF PATENT -BASED
EPK PROPOSALS
Two broad responses to resistance are possible: (1) conserve EPK to
delay resistance and/or (2) stimulate the development of innovative new
drugs.198 The former is the demand side response of conservation; the latter
is the supply side goal of innovation.
Of course, society must pursue both approaches simultaneously. The
principal challenge is to balance the available resources between conservation
and innovation, achieving simultaneous solution sets to multiple externality
and coordination problems.
The next section applies the framework developed thus far against recent
patent proposals concerning antibiotic resistance. The first proposal focuses
primarily on private conservation of EPK through expanded IP rights; the

194. See Livermore, supra note 4, at s11.
195. Goeschl & Swanson, supra note 4, at ___. NEED PINPOINT
196. Livermore, supra note 4, at s20 (noting that “[a]ntibacterial resistance is complex and
dynamic”).
197. Id. at s11. See, e.g., Daniel F. Sahm et al., Need for Annual Surveillance of Antimicrobial
Resistance in Streptococcus Pneumoniae in the United States: 1-Year Longitudinal Analysis, 45
ANTIMICR OBIAL AGENT S & CHEMOTHERAPY 1037-42 (2001) (concluding that more resources should be
devoted to tracking the changes in antibiotic resistance on a more frequent basis).
198. Goeschl and Swanson describe it as follows: “either (a) slow the rate of arrival of biological
problems; and/or (b) increase the rate of arrival of solutions to such problems.” Goeschl & Swanson, supra
note 4, at 5.
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second focuses on promoting EPK innovation through expanded IP rights.
Both proposals expand the patent domain at the expense of the public domain.
A. Conservation of EPK Through Extended Patent Terms
Eric Kades has explored patent-based conservation of EPK in his recent
article, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of
Antibiotics.199 This attention is focused upon consumer waste: the problem
of current low-value usage of antibiotics (treatment of minor infections) which
exhausts the resource and prevents its effective utilization in subsequent highvalue situations (life-threatening infections).200 Kades claims the consumer
must internalize these costs in order to avoid waste: “Unless there is some
mechanism to force consumers to bear this cost when they buy antibiotics,
they will ignore it and the populace will overuse antibiotics relative to the
socially optimal level.”201 Kades also identifies the broader problem of waste
by the patent holder and in the public domain, which is broadly consistent
with my discussion above.202
We part company when Kades proposes expanded IP rights as a
conservation tool. In his view, EPK patent periods should be extremely
long.203 Kades argues that longer patent terms reduce the firm’s proclivity to
waste. Likewise, expanded patent rent extraction from consumers operates as

199. Kades, supra note 44, at 643.
200. Id. at 626-29. Brown and Layton also highlight the privately maximizing individual who ignores
the impact of therapeutic antibiotic use on others. Brown & Layton, supra note 39, at 355. To be clear,
they have not proved that individuals do act in this way; they have only assumed that if individuals are
rational individual maximizers, and if they take no account of the negative externalities from their antibiotic
use, then they will overuse antibiotics from a social-welfare perspective. Imposing Pigovian rents to
optimize antibiotic use is the natural extension of these assumptions.
201. Kades, supra note 44, at 626.
202. Id. at 625-67.
203. Id. at 651.
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a Pigovian tax to dampen consumer waste.204 The proposal stands or falls on
whether it succeeds as a conservation system for EPK.
1. Conservation through Pigovian Rents
Kades addresses patent holder waste by delaying the day of reckoning.
This point is well taken. If patents never expire, then we do not have to worry
about waste caused solely by time-limited property rights.205
But we have many other types of waste to be concerned about. Firms
generally operate with a limited time horizon. With quarterly earnings targets
to meet, a publicly traded pharmaceutical company with perpetual patents
might still be tempted to sell more now rather than later.206 Kades assumes
that longer patent terms will enable holders to optimize their marketing,
saving important drugs for their highest and best uses. A recent article from
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, a major marketer of antibiotics, suggests that this
faith may be misplaced. The author argued for more aggressive use of
antibiotics, even for upper respiratory infections which were viral rather than
bacterial. He explicitly denied the need to balance larger social needs (“we
cannot elevate the goal of preventing resistance above our primary
responsibility of treating infected patients”) and advocated a very different
treatment protocol than Kades: “antibacterial treatment must only be denied
when there is a near certainty that the patient will derive no benefit. . . .”207
204. “This section makes a novel and radical argument that patent terms for antibiotics should be
extremely long.” Id. at 614. Kades’s argument is that public health would be maximized by granting longterm or much longer patents for drugs that lose effectiveness with use, such as antibiotics. Id. at 643-53.
A patent holder rationally maximizes sales during the exclusive marketing period, even for uses which are
medically marginal. From a public-health perspective, this practice speeds the development of resistant
strains of bacteria or viruses. Global public health would be maximized by extending the exclusive
marketing period indefinitely and encouraging judicious use of the drug in the most compelling cases. Id.
at 614. Philipson and Mechoulan have primarily made Kades’s “novel” point when they conclude that the
optimal patent life is infinite if the good creates negative externalities, giving antibiotic resistance as one
example. TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & STÉPHANE MECHOULAN , INTELLEC TUAL PROPERTY & EXTERNAL
CONSUMPTION EFFECTS: GENERALIZATIONS FROM PHARM ACEUT ICAL MARKETS 9, 13-14 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9598, 2003). Establishing longer or perpetual patents for antibiotics
would be a complete reversal of pre-Hatch-Waxman policy, which restricted special generic entry only to
antibiotics. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1996), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 125(b)(1), 111 Stat. 2325 (1997).
While the Hatch-Waxman Act expanded the generic entry process to other drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2004),
the special generic entry process for antibiotics was not repealed until 1997.
205. NEED CITE
206. Put another way, firms may employ idiosyncratic discount rates when making intertemporal
comparisons.
207. Steve J. Projan, Why is Big Pharma Getting out of Antibacterial Drug Discovery?, 6 CURRENT
OPINION IN MICROBIOLOGY 427, 428 (2003).
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EPK still needs to be managed while in the patent domain. Kades proposes
to let drug companies manage EPK with expanded pharmaceutical
appropriation rents. It is hoped that these Pigovian rents208 will squeeze lessvaluable uses out of the market.209 This neoclassical model simplifies the
reality of pharmaceutical markets in several unfortunate respects as addressed
in the following paragraphs.
(a) Heterogeneous Externalities
A major difficulty with Pigovian rents is the heterogeneity of
externalities, requiring many different rents which vary over time, place, and
use.210 The rent should correspond with the particular externality. Take the
example of animal feed use of antibiotics. Kades wants animal feed taxed out
of the market first,211 but the medical evidence is unclear as to the nature and
strength of the linkages between animal use and human resistance. Veterinary
use may create less of an externality than inappropriate human use.212
Pigovian rents on animal use should likewise vary across different drugs and
uses and over time as the scientific understanding changes.
In human use, the externalities vary widely. For antibiotics which
exhaust quickly, the negative externality of inappropriate use is quite high.
For others, the opposite will be true. A particular drug can generate different
externalities in different uses and users. Hospitals produce greater resistance
externalities per pound of antibiotic used; community use creates less

208. Pigovian rent (a possible neologism) is my term for Kades’s goal: to use patent rents for
Pigovian purposes.
209. Kades nowhere explicitly says that Pigovian rents will be administered solely through
pharmaceutical appropriation rents, but several times it is assumed. For example, he states that actors “on
the ground” will be able to set optimal Pigovian rents much better than government. Kades, supra note 44,
at 637. On the subsequent page it appears that some element of the tax will be set by government fiat,
namely the rising tax to account for the time value of money. Id. at 638-39. He later suggests that the
deadweight losses (sales prices above the marginal cost of production) are the mechanism to reduce
unnecessary use. Id. at 645.
210. Kades dodges these “calibration” issues. Id. at 644. Brown and Layton acknowledge the
potential for heterogeneity, but assume it away to simplify their model. Brown & Layton, supra note 39,
at 353 n.6. However, Brown & Layton conclude that a social planner would need detailed information on
antibiotics and resistance. Id. at 355.
211. Cf. Kades, supra note 44, at 618, 639.
212. Glycopeptide use in animals and humans may not create the same level of externalities due to
biological differences between humans and domesticated animal species. This point is sometimes missed
in the debates over animal use of antibiotics. See, e.g., Warren Kaplan & Richard Laing, WHO, at
PRIORITY MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD 48-53 (2004); Ian M. Gould, Antibiotic
Use—Ecological Issues and Required Actions, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 701-03.
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resistance per pound.213 Non-prescription antibiotic use in household devices
may be another category. Pigovian rents would have to vary by these factors
as well.214
Pharmaceutical products are usually priced by product, geography, and
payor rather than intended use. Arbitrage between uses could be expected to
develop, undermining the Pigovian effect. While it might certainly be
possible to segment animal and human markets, arbitrage within the
community pharmacy or hospital ICU would be a daunting barrier. Arbitrage
across the Canadian border has been hard to stop;215 arbitrage within domestic
markets will be more difficult still because the legal tools to hinder crossborder pharmaceutical arbitrage are not generally available within a common
market such as the U.S.
(b) Heterogeneous Consumers
Consumers are also heterogeneous. In the U.S., the demand elasticity for
drugs is quite low, particularly among the wealthy and those with third-party
insurance for drugs.216 Low-income uninsured populations exhibit a more
elastic demand curve.217 Rates of resistance are higher in children,218 requiring

213. Ian M. Gould, Antibiotic Use—Ecological Issues and Required Actions, in ANTIBIOTIC
POLICIES, supra note 4, at 706; Fiona M. MacKenzie & Ian M. Gould, Quantitative Measurement of
Antibiotic Use, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES , supra note 4, at 105 (“Although the greatest use in human
medicine is in the community, it is the intensive use of antibiotics in our hospitals that has the greatest
impact on resistance.”).
214. For mathematical models of the emergence of resistance to different treatment regimes, see
Lipsitch & Levin, supra note 189, at 363.
215. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 277-80.
216. See, e.g., A. Leibowitz, W.G. Manning & J.P. Newhouse, The Demand for Prescription Drugs
as a Function of Cost-Sharing, 21 SOC . SCI. MED . 1063-69 (1985) (cost-sharing affects the use of
prescription drugs); John D. Piette, Michele Heisler & Todd H. Wagner, Cost-Related Medication
Underuse, 164 ARCH . INTERN. MED . 1749 (Sept. 13, 2004) (survey of older American adults with chronic
illnesses who reported underusing medication due to cost); Vincenzo Atella et al., Affordability of
Medicines and Patents’ Cost Reduction Behaviors: Empirical Evidence Based on SUR Estimates From
Italy and the United Kingdom 2 (CEIS Working Paper No. 71, Apr. 2005), available at http://www.
ssrn.com/abstract=648009 (“Demand for prescription drugs is reduced by a direct contribution from the
patient, even though the overall impact of co-payment remains quite limited, with price elasticity ranging
between -0.1 to -0.6.”).
217. For an example of these effects, see W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH & ECO N OM IC
WELFARE 81-86 (1969); KLAUS DEININGER & PAUL MPUGA, ECONOMIC AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE
ABOLITION OF HEALTH USER FEES: EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA 1, 19 (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 3276, Apr. 2004) (noting that demand for health services in Uganda is elastic, thus the abolition
of health user fees improved access and reduced the probability of sickness, especially for the poor); see
also F.M. Scherer & J. Watal, The Economics of TRIPS Options for Access to Medicines, in ESSENTIAL
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adjustment for the age of the patient. A flat Pigovian rent might reduce
utilization, but it would be relatively ineffective among the rich, and far too
effective among the poor. The wealthy would still engage in consumer
waste;219 the poor would forego therapeutically important drugs.220
One possible solution would be to vary Pigovian rents with the wealth of
the consumer, or more precisely, their willingness to pay. This possible
solution is actually a proposal for perfect price discrimination, a very unlikely
proposal.221 Consumers will not willingly disclose their financial information
to pharmaceutical companies so that pricing can be adjusted accordingly,
particularly when it must be combined with patient-identifiable clinical
information on health status. Accounting for these factors will require drug
companies to obtain and utilize massive amounts of patient-specific clinical
information before a pricing decision becomes final. Even in the absence of
medical privacy, opportunities for arbitrage and cheating would abound,
undermining the salutary effect of the Pigovian rents.
Kades suggests that drug firms might segment markets for price
discrimination purposes by differential branding of the same drug within the
U.S. market.222 This is unlikely to work within the U.S. market so long as
physicians are permitted to prescribe for off-label uses, a major feature of U.S.
prescription markets.223
Another weakness of enhanced price discrimination is that it gives too
much market power to drug companies. Once perfect price discrimination is
in place, companies will wield near-total market power, without any guarantee
that the result will serve public health. They could induce further demand

MEDICINES, supra note 28, at 44.
218. Karlowsky et al., supra note 151, at 963-70 (demonstrating statistically significant rates of
resistance to penicillin, azithromycin, TMP-SMX, and ceftriaxone amongst persons under 18).
219. Health plans marketed to the rich might well tout their less restrictive plan design. The very
wealthy can purchase antibiotics at any market price and may have a near-zero demand elasticity.
220. The patients who will be most sensitive to the price mechanism (Pigovian rent) will be the nonwealthy uninsured. In low-income countries, antibiotic resistance is driven more by underutilization. Denis
K. Byarugaba, Antimicrobial Resistance and its Containment in Developing Countries, in ANTIBIOTIC
POLICIES, supra note 4, at 617, 633-35.
221. Kades, supra note 44, at 647-48. For an extended discussion of price discrimination in
pharmaceutical markets, see Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 203-08.
222. Kades, supra note 44, at 647.
223. The FDA permits a physician to prescribe an approved drug for any use, including a use not
specified on the label (an “off-label” use). The FDA Final Rule on Dissemination of Information on
Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Devises was published on November 20, 1998.
63 Fed. Reg. 64556 (Nov. 20, 1998). On June 16, 2005, the FDA solicited additional comments on this
rule. 70 Fed. Reg. 35099 (June 16, 1980). Kades’s domestic price discrimination plan would collapse once
physicians switched to off-label prescriptions of the cheaper drug.
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through pharmaceutical promotion,224 armed with patient-level prescription
and financial data. No market tool would be available to police the near-total
appropriation of consumer surplus. Indeed, drug companies could
conceivably extract appropriation rents in excess of consumer surplus.
Kades concedes that EPK requires a heterogeneous Pigovian rent in at
least one circumstance. He proposes a rising tax to account for the rate of
inflation.225 Heterogeneity is addressed primarily in the context where it is
easiest to model: the time value of money. Adjusting Pigovian rents only for
inflation ignores many other biological and clinical complexities which might
call for significant adjustments. These effects are likely to swamp the timevalue price increase modeled in Preserving a Precious Resource.
All of this seems like overkill when one recognizes that only 5 conditions
account for 75% of all unnecessary ambulatory antibiotic prescriptions.226
Experts suggest that 3 conditions should be targeted to substantially reduce
community abuse of antibiotics: urinary tract infections, pharyngitis, and
bronchitis.227 In other words, consumer EPK waste228 could be largely
addressed by targeting these 3 conditions, rather than embarking upon a major
revision of the pharmaceutical patent system.
(c) Biological Complexity
Kades makes assumptions about antibiotic resistance which are
inappropriate in some cases. The model breaks down for some diseases and
some antibiotics, making a uniform extension of all EPK patents
inappropriate. Several examples illustrate the point.
Kades models antibiotic resistance as gradual and proportional,229
borrowing heavily from models of mineral exhaustion.230 Recall the

224. RATIONAL USE , supra note 102, ¶ 26 (“Pharmaceutical promotion often has negative effects on
prescribing and consumer choice, but regulation of promotional activities has been proven to be one of the
few effective interventions.”). Kades appears to assume that the negative effects of drug promotion will
cease under a perpetual patent regime.
225. Kades, supra note 44, at 638.
226. Gonzales et al., supra note 77, at 757-60.
227. Id. at 760.
228. Institutional waste (i.e., in hospital ICUs) is not included in these figures.
229. Kades, supra note 44, at 614-35. Brown and Layton employ the same assumption, but conclude
that the social planner requires detailed information on antibiotics and resistance. Brown & Layton, supra
note 54, at 353, 355.
230. In particular, the “Hotelling Rule.” Kades, supra note 44, at 629-35. The economics of pricing
exhaustible resources is discussed by Louis Phlips, The Economics of Price Discrimination 111-33 (1983),
including his interesting modification to Coase, id. at 125-29.
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discussion on the biological complexity of resistance in Section II.D.6 above.
For each of those examples, a different optimal use pattern may be
appropriate.231 Modifying patent length is not a nimble tool for such fine
tuning. For example, assume that the optimal use pattern for a particular
situation is cycled through various restrictions over a long period of time as
resistance slowly builds towards a clinically determined threshold. Once the
threshold is reached, widespread use is called for (the “blowout”).232
Modifying patent length to fit this use pattern is not simple.233
Consider some of the other cases of biological complexity. Some drugs
should be used in rotation. Instead of a blowout, the drug should be put on the
shelf for a while and not used at all. A perpetual patent here is one option, but
the clinical issue could be more directly addressed by temporarily
withdrawing FDA marketing approval.234 Other drugs will require one set of
conservation techniques in the community and an entirely different strategy
in the ICU. Some microbes have not developed resistance to a particular
antibiotic despite half a century of use.235 Others develop resistance much
more quickly. 236 Prismatic and shifting patent rights in these circumstances
appear to be very complex and would invite arbitrage and abuse.
Preserving a Precious Resource also does not address the complexities
of class effects and the need for FDC. 237 For some drugs, the unit of
conservation must be the class, not merely the drug or its patents. FDCs
frequently contain drugs from multiple classes. To account for these
conditions requires patents which are extraordinarily broad, in addition to

231. Clem Tisdell makes this point explicitly in the 1982 article that Kades celebrates as seminal.
Tisdell, supra note 74, at 430; Kades, supra note 44, at 638. Kades also states that “Clem Tisdell was the
first to point out this problem, in an article inexplicably ignored by subsequent scholarship.” Kades, supra
note 44, at 626. Tisdell has been cited by others prior to Kades; for example, in Ramanan Laxminarayan’s
excellent book, BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra note 29, at 14.
232. For a discussion on mathematical models of resistance, comparing combination therapy with
cycling, see Roger L. White, How Do Measurements of Antibiotic Consumption Relate to Antibiotic
Resistance, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 90-91.
233. Perhaps the patent could expire on the blowout date, but then most of the rents would be denied
to the innovator. If the patent expires long after the blowout date, nothing of value enters the public
domain.
234. If innovation incentives were inadequate (a fact to be proven, not assumed), then a HatchWaxman extension of patent rights during the shelf period might be appropriate.
235. Ian M. Gould, Antibiotic Use—Ecological Issues and Required Actions, in ANTIBIOTIC
POLICIES, supra note 4, at 704 (noting how penicillin resistance has not developed in Streptococcus
pyogenes “despite over 50 years of intense exposure”).
236. Id. at 704-05.
237. Close competitors and class effects are discussed, but the negative implications for extending
patent forms is left unexamined. Kades, supra note 44, at 623.
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eternal.238 A single firm must own perpetual rights to an entire class of
antibiotics. When resistance crosses classes, or where FDCs are indicated,
multiple classes must be joined together. This is hardly a market-based
approach, but instead a remarkable expansion of market power and
concentration in the hands of a single pharmaceutical firm in the hope that the
firm will manage utilization for the highest good of the planet.
GlaxoSmithKline holds a 45% global market share in ARVs for the treatment
of AIDS.239 The experience of the last decade with the AIDS treatment crisis
should not encourage us to give GlaxoSmithKline the whole ball of wax.
(d) Health Care Consumer Behavior
The neoclassical model assumes that patients will make wise choices on
antibiotic usage under the influence of Pigovian rents.240 Preserving a
Precious Resource utilizes an example of cost-benefit analysis by a rational
patient which is unrealistic241 given the realities of the health care market. It
is assumed, rather than proven, that private decentralized actors (e.g.,
physicians, patients, pharmacists, drug representatives) will collect and use
superior information to maximize the exhaustible resource in response to
Pigovian rents.242 The literature on irrationality, conflicts of interest,
information costs, and third-party payments in pharmaceutical markets is large
and persuasive, and needs to be addressed before such a position can be taken
seriously.243 Physicians and patients make many terrible decisions on medical
care. Even complex and dangerous heart surgeries are subject to inappropriate

238. See Ramanan Laxminarayan, Economic Responses to the Problem of Drug Resistance, in THE
RESISTANCE PHENOMENON IN MICROBES AND INFEC TIOUS DISEASE VECTORS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN
HEALTH AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTAINMENT 126 (Stacey L. Knobler et al. eds., 2003).
239. Glaxo’s HIV Drugs Come Under Pressure, WALL ST . J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B3 (45% global
market share); see also GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2004 Annual Report, Form 20-F (Mar. 8, 2005), at 25
(antiretroviral sales data), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last
visited June 22, 2005).
240. See Kades, supra note 44, at 639 tbl. 4.
241. Id. at 640. The emphasis on testing and diagnostics is laudable, but the assumed rationality of
the patient as an economic actor does not comport with reality.
242. See id. at 626 (“Unless there is some mechanism to force consumers to bear this cost when they
buy antibiotics, they will ignore it and the populace will overuse antibiotics relative to the socially optimal
level.”) (suggesting that higher prices will sort high-value from low-value pharmaceutical use).
243. Richard Frank provides a helpful introduction to behavioral economics literature in health care.
Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics (NBER Working Paper 10881, Oct.
2004), available at http://www.nber/papers/w10881.
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choices.244 The quality of information and decision making is unlikely to be
greater on lower-profile pharmaceuticals.245
Two examples should lay down the gauntlet. First, Preserving a Precious
Resource sidesteps the growing ubiquity in the U.S. of third-party payments
for prescriptions, both in community settings and in the institutions where
antibiotic use is highest.246 If Pigovian rents are placed on the health plan,
then the consumer is isolated from the attempt to internalize the cost, and
consumer waste is not modified.
If the rent is borne by the health plan, but some cost is to be passed
through to employees or beneficiaries, then the health plan will regulate
antibiotic usage with managed care techniques. Since the goal here is not cost
savings, but optimizing conservation of EPK, the techniques would have to be
heterogeneous.247 Common techniques for drugs include prior authorization,
disease management, tiered copays, education, and academic detailing.248 For
example, the copay for an antibiotic for a child’s sore throat might vary from
$0 to $1,000249 depending upon factors such as clinical history, an in-office
strep test, the antibiotic prescribed, and financial resources. Other tools
attempt to raise the quality of information provided in the health care

244. Up to 769 former patients at Redding Medical Center have sued for unnecessary invasive
procedures such as cardiac catheterizations and coronary artery bypass grafts. The hospital settled for $395
million and four referring cardiologists settled for $24 million. Laura Mahoney, Redding Cardiologists Pay
$24 Million To Settle Claims From 769 Surgery Patients, 14 BNA HEALTH L. REP . 97, 97 (Jan. 20, 2005).
The suit alleged that the physicians were tempted by fees to perform unnecessary heart surgeries. Id.
245. For a discussion on the sources of inappropriate patterns of antibiotic prescribing, see Sandra
L. Arnold, Interventions to Improve Antibiotic Prescribing, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 494.
246. Reimbursement for outpatient prescription drugs is growing, particularly after the passage of
the new Part D Medicare Drug Benefit. Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. Antibiotic usage is particularly intense in inpatient hospital settings, where
the costs are often included within case-billed reimbursement systems such as the Medicare Prospective
Payment System. Third-party reimbursement in the rest of the high-income world is even more pervasive.
The December 2004 meeting of the WHO Executive Board recommended the extension of third-party
payment mechanisms for essential medicines for low-income populations, using the insurance systems to
promote more rational usage. RATIONAL USE , supra note 102, ¶¶ 14-18.
247. If one allows each health plan to make its own choices here, some will market themselves to the
wealthy as plans with fewer restrictions. On the other hand, if one constrains health-plan choice, the
government is conserving EPK.
248. Sandra L. Arnold, Interventions to Improve Antibiotic Prescribing, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES,
supra note 4, at 497, 500-19 (providing a systematic review of all published studies on interventions to
improve antibiotic prescribing). Only one of Arnold’s 11 categories employs financial incentives, and the
published literature is weak on the effectiveness of financial incentives to reduce prescriptions of antibiotics
and antibiotic resistance. Id. at 511, 518-19.
249. This figures assumes a Pigovian rent significant enough to influence consumer behavior. For
very wealthy consumers, $1,000 might be too little to meet Kades’ goal of socially optimal prescribing.
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marketplace. For example, Medicare is now attempting to improve the quality
of physician and hospital practices by paying bonuses for meeting quality
targets.250 Quality advocates are attempting to improve hospital infectioncontrol practices through public disclosure of infection data.251 Cruise ship
companies are scrambling to implement infection-control policies before the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention publish data on viral and bacterial
outbreaks on ships.252
The ubiquity of such tools begs the question: Why bother with greatly
extended patents? If conservation ultimately depends upon managed care
techniques after the long trickle down from greatly extended patents and
Pigovian rents, it seems easier and more efficient to do so directly.
Second, rational allocation is unlikely because of severe informational
problems endemic to health care. Kades wants to “allow the parties ‘on the
ground’ dealing with the problem to draw on their superior information when
they decide where and when to economize on the use of a taxed resource.”253
This is not an accurate description of a typical physician-patient encounter.
Physicians and patients are overwhelmed with the complexity of clinical
information on infectious diseases and available therapies.254 Health plans
strictly limit the time the physician can spend with a patient and the effort the
physician can expend on tailoring the treatment to the patient’s unique
needs.255 Much of the needed information is unknown to the clinicians256 and

250. Sarah Lueck, Medicare to Pay Bonuses to Doctors For Cutting Costs, WALL ST . J., Feb. 1,
2005, at A2.
251. Rhonda L. Rundle, Germ Reports: Some Push to Make Hospitals Disclose Rates of Infection,
WALL ST . J., Feb. 1, 2005, at A1.
252. Evan Perez & Betsy McKay, Cruise Lines Press for New Term to Describe Viral ‘Outbreak’,
WALL ST . J., Feb. 8, 2005, at B1.
253. Kades, supra note 44, at 637.
254. See, e.g., Avorn & Solomon, supra note 10, at 128-30 (describing factors leading to antibiotic
misuse). Several resolutions concerning drug advertising were considered by the American Medical
Association’s House of Delegates in its 2005 Annual Meeting. In general, these resolutions bemoaned the
poor quality of information delivered to patients through pharmaceutical company DTC advertising. AMA
2005 Annual Meeting, Reports and Resolutions (Reference Committee E), Resolutions 507, 519, 524, 532,
533, and 536, available at www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15078.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
Under intense lobbying pressure from drug companies, the AMA deferred the question to a study committee
until next year.
255. More precisely, payors primarily control reimbursement. The physician can spend all day with
the patient if he wants to, but the health plan will only pay for a 15-minute visit.
256. See Gavin Barlow, Pneumonia Guidelines in Practice, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4,
at 39 (discussing interventions in cases of community-acquired pneumonia (CAP)).
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even more remote from drug companies who would be calibrating the
incentives. In the absence of good information, consumer waste returns.257
Other significant users of antibiotics operate with better information,
particularly a hospital ICU choosing an antibiotic regime for a patient. But it
might be better still to allow the hospital to treat patients based solely on
evidence-based medicine. Imposing Pigovian rents on hospitals for
noncompliance with the patent owner’s clinical instructions seems to be a
significant move away from a free market258 without providing proof of better
outcomes.
A more likely path is to improve the quality of information available to
the decision makers. Kades dismisses such antibiotic conservation programs
as “jawboning.”259 Empirical studies support the efficacy of some programs
to reduce unnecessary antibiotic use.260 Kades simply presumes that “hard”
incentives will be more effective, without empirical support.261 Studies
suggest that conservation problems are much broader than the simple selection
of the wrong drug, and include problems with inappropriate dosage, timing,
compliance, and regimes.262 Likewise, EPK conservation involves many
interventions, including antibiotic policies, formularies, prescription
guidelines, audits, and enforcement.263 Pigovian rents would have to be
extraordinarily detailed and complex to succeed in changing clinical practices.
The limited empirical data do not support a case for Pigovian rents as the
primary EPK conservation tool. In a study of antibiotic consumption amongst

257. A better option would be to improve the knowledge base so that EPK could be more effectively
managed. Kades’s suggestions on subsidizing diagnostic R&D falls into the category. Kades, supra note
44, at 639-41. This idea, while laudable, does not require longer patent terms. For discussions along this
line, see Section III.A.3 below.
258. Kades asserts that “[t]he patent system is thus part and parcel of a market economy” and both
“are necessary evils.” Kades, supra note 44, at 644-45. However, they are not necessary; alternatives are
on the table especially after discovery and the granting of the patent. For example, Kades also discusses
patent buyouts, but assumes that all of the evils of mariginal cost pricing must follow the buyout. This is
certainly not correct. Id. at 646.
259. Id. at 635-38.
260. Kades, supra note 44, at 638 (“For these reasons, this Article proceeds on the premise that ‘hard’
economic incentives such as taxed, subsidies, and changes in patent rights are much more effective
measures that legislative fiat, jawboning, and education.”). For a review of the literature on measures to
reduce inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions, see Parrino, supra note 9; Avorn, supra note 9; and Arnold,
supra note 193. ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, at (empirical studies).
261. Kades, supra note 44.
262. Ian Phillips, Antibiotic Policies—A Historical Perspective, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note
4, at 10.
263. Erwin M. Brown, Intervention to Optimize Antibiotic Prescribing in Hospitals: The UK
Approach, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 163-76.
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high-income countries, the U.S., with the highest prices in the world, ranked
in the middle. French consumption was nearly 50% higher, followed closely
by Spain and Portugal. Countries with significantly lower consumption
included the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Germany and the
Netherlands.264 Since the U.S. enjoys both the highest prices and a strong
pharmaceutical appropriation environment,265 it is hard to make a case that the
significant variations in antibiotic consumption are due to domestic financial
factors. In the community setting, the two most reliable studies on financial
incentives for antibiotic conservation utilized formularies and primary care
reforms.266 Both techniques can be implemented without modifying patent
law.
Some lessons can be drawn from tobacco control where a combination of
education, legal restrictions and taxes have reduced utilization. A key
distinction between nicotine and other drugs is that there are no therapeutic
uses of nicotine. If restrictive measures regarding nicotine are too powerful,
no one is denied access to a lifesaving product. The clinical markets for
antibiotics are much more complex, and the stakes for under-utilization are
much higher, particularly for the poor who are most vulnerable to
inappropriate rationing by price.
The most effective intervention to conserve EPK may be infection control
and better diagnostic tools.267 The least complicated intervention would be a
subsidy for these practices.
(e) Globalization and TRIPS
While Preserving a Precious Resource focuses primarily on domestic
conservation of EPK, the biology of resistance necessitates global
conservation in some cases, with the caveats expressed in Section II.D.1
above. Globalization makes the conservation of exhaustible drugs a planetary

264. Sigvard Mölstad & Otto Cars, Antibiotic Use in the Community, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra
note 4, at 569.
265. By this, I mean the highest degree of pharmaceutical appropriation.
266. Sandra L. Arnold, Interventions to Improve Antibiotic Prescribing, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES,
supra note 4, at 510-11.
267. Extensive literature documents the effectiveness of infection control. See, e.g., Hakan
Hanberger et al., Intensive Care Unit, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES at 273-74. Kades concedes the need for
better diagnostic tools. Kades, supra note 44, at 639-41. No change to antibiotic patents is necessary in
order to subsidize diagnostics, nor would Pigovian rents be required. Society would be better off with the
subsidized diagnostic tools at marginal cost, stripped of patent rents. The diagnostic tools themselves
should not suffer from the overutilization problem plaguing EPK generally.
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priority. Actions by the United States to manage resistance might be laudable,
and locally effective to some degree, but will not be fully effective absent
effective global coordination mechanisms. Kades acknowledged the
international coordination issue,268 but simply hopes that each democracy will
select either Pigovian taxes or much longer patents. After the TRIPS
Agreement, the global appetite for longer pharmaceutical patents seems to be
quite limited,269 and Pigovian taxes on antibiotic use stands in marked contrast
to the social insurance models in Canada, Australia and the EU. Indeed, it is
hard to politically imagine antibiotic Pigovian taxes on U.S. beneficiaries of
Medicaid or the Medicare Part D drug benefit. But putting aside these
questions of practical politics, price differences would be created if one
country adopted Pigovian taxes, another chose much longer patents, and a
third followed neither course. Price differences (and, thus, arbitrage pressure)
in each country would be accentuated by non-uniform adoption of these policy
options.270 Kades acknowledges these global coordination problems as a
“weakest link” in his proposals, but does not otherwise articulate solutions.271
Global extensions of pharmaceutical patent terms will run afoul of the
TRIPS agreement. It is highly unlikely that low- and middle-income countries
will agree to extend antibiotic patent terms. Indeed, the goal of the essential
medicines movement has been to reduce the extraction of patent rents and
other forms of pharmaceutical appropriation from low- and middle-income
populations. The TRIPS agreement is unlikely to be a global coordination
mechanism to extend EPK patents significantly.272 The proliferation of the
TRIPS agreement and provisions in U.S. free trade agreements are minor
adjustments compared to this major proposed change. TRIPS is more likely
to act in the opposite capacity, as a rallying point against patent extensions.
Perpetual patents would require special treatment for a subset of
pharmaceutical patents; effectively, a TRIPS exception for EPK patents. This
would likely violate TRIPS nondiscrimination principles, at least if the views
of the United States Trade Representative Office (USTR) remain consistent.273
Kades’s proposal amounts to expanding TRIPS with much longer patents for
EPK. Issues of access and equity are fobbed off to either counterproductive
268. Kades, supra note 44, at 669-71.
269. See the discussion in the next paragraph infra.
270. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 205-16 (theory of pharmaceutical arbitrage),
275-91 (cross-border pharmaceutical arbitrage from Canada to the U.S.).
271. Kades, supra note 44, at 653-54, 671.
272. The proliferation of TRIPS + provisions in U.S. free-trade agreements are minor adjustments
compared to this proposed change.
273. AUSFTA Comment on Labour Amendments (2004).

2005]

RUNNING HEAD

49

prescription subsidies or the goodwill of pharmaceutical companies, placing
low- and middle-income communities at the mercy of voluntary differential
pricing programs and drug company charity.
(f) Planning for the Plague Year
Preserving a Precious Resource places particular emphasis on the
dangers of a major epidemic.274 The patent system seems a particularly
awkward mechanism to horde drugs for a global epidemic. Pharmaceutical
firms are unlikely to hold powerful drugs in reserve for the plague year.275
Even with much longer patents, the firm must expect revenues, and market
revenues may not arrive until the epidemic. Firms have difficulty modeling
the “big payday” of a plague. The timing is uncertain at best. The revenues
are even more uncertain. Once the plague hits, market pricing may not
prevail. During an epidemic, governments might attack “price gouging” and
impose severe price controls. In the face of an anthrax scare in the U.S.,
Bayer felt this pressure most acutely. 276 Perpetual patents do not resolve this
time-consistency problem. 277
Even under perpetual patents, firms would require credible commitments
to a discounted cash flow. Possible market-making techniques include patent
buyouts, prizes, strategic stockpiles, and contractual purchase commitments.278
Most importantly, if these techniques succeed in making a market for the

274. Cf. Kades, supra note 44, at 653-54.
275. Even with a perpetual patent, it is unlikely that Bayer would halt sales of Cipro until an anthrax
attack. Patients at risk of dying in the meantime for want of Cipro might have ethical or legal claims
against Bayer. For an account of social upheaval during a plague, see DANIEL DEFOE, A JOURNAL OF THE
PLAGUE YEAR 1722 (John Berseth ed., 2001).
276. Jill Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer To Slash Price U.S. Pays for Cipro Drug, WALL ST . J.,
Oct. 25, 2001, at A3 (“The agreement comes after a high-stakes threat by Tommy Thompson, HHS
secretary, to break Bayer’s patent for Cipro if he didn’t get the price he wanted.”). The U.S. compulsory
license statutes are 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000) (patents necessary for the nation’s food supply); 17 U.S.C.
§ 115 (2000) (copyrights to certain musical works); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000) (patents); 35 U.S.C. § 203
(2000) (patents developed through the use of government research funding under the Bayh-Dole Act); and
42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000) (atomic energy). The U.S. compulsory license statutes do not contain the
restrictions required by Article 31 of TRIPS. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, art. 31. For an
authoritative review of United States and Canadian experience with compulsory licensure, see Jerome H.
Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, UNCTAD, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical
Perspective, Legal Framework Under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA
19-22 (Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 5, 2003).
277. Kades, supra note 44, at 657-59 (discussing, but not resolving, the time-consistency problem).
278. See supra note ___ NEED CITE and accompanying text concerning alternatives to the patent
appropriation system.
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unknown plague year, then the special case for longer patents evaporates. If
the time-consistency problem can be solved for an uncertain plague far in the
future, it could be resolved much more directly today, without bothering with
much longer patents.
2. Longer Patents Constrain Access
While complaints of complexity and ineffectiveness might dull the
charms of Preserving a Precious Resource, a much more serious charge
awaits: Pigovian rents will kill people. Low-income patients will be denied
important therapies. The demand elasticity for prescription drugs in the U.S.
is quite low. In order to change behavior, Pigovian rents on EPK must be
quite high. Using prices to ration utilization of EPK will constrain
therapeutically important access for the poor. This case is particularly
compelling in low-income populations where antibiotic prices are already too
high, constraining therapeutically important use, and thereby encouraging
resistance.279
Kades’s model tends to equate “maximal production” with “socially
optimal,” ignoring the questions of distributional equity and access. This is
another way of assuming that Pigovian rents will ration for optimal public
health.280 As discussed in Sections II.B and III.A.1 above, there is scant
evidence for this position in pharmaceutical markets, and considerable
experience to the contrary, most notably with equitable access to AIDS drugs.
Kades addresses equity concerns by suggesting that government could
subsidize antibiotic prices for the poor to ensure access. It is left unsaid
whether this principle should be extended globally to the billions who lack
affordable access to essential patented drugs. In any case, these subsidies
undermine the intended Pigovian effects on these consumers. When these
subsidies are added, the last vestiges of a market-based approach is stripped
away. Conservation amongst these subsidized populations would require the

279. Denis K. Byarugaba, Antimicrobial Resistance and its Containment in Developing Countries,
in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 618, 633-35. Much longer patents also do not work for the socalled ‘neglected’ diseases which are endemic primarily in the low-income world and therefore do not
represent a significant pharmaceutical market. Multiple-drug resistant tuberculosis and malaria are
prominent examples.
280. Kades, supra note 44, at 665. Brown and Layton make similar assumptions. Brown & Layton,
supra note 54, at 353 (“At any point in time, the central planner can be envisaged as ordering the
population from the most sick to the least sick, and treating the most sick first.”).
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conservation and education techniques which Kades dismisses as
“jawboning.”281
3. Innovation under Significantly Longer Patents
The supply-side innovation case for patents is not a major focus of
Preserving a Precious Resource, but the issue warrants four comments.
First, longer (or perpetual) patents would indeed strengthen appropriation,
but the effect is not linear. Doubling the patent period does not double the net
present value (NPV) of R&D cost recovery. If inflation is at 5%, the NPV of
$1 in year 21 is only 35.9 cents. At higher rates of inflation, the NPV drops
significantly.282 The public domain would be privatized at a discount.
Second, before one embarks upon raising pharmaceutical appropriation
rents, consensus should be reached as to whether additional rents are a good
idea. Additional pharmaceutical rents come at a great cost to society. Some
commentators suggest that pharmaceutical appropriation is already supraoptimal for innovation.283 This question must be addressed with transparent
and independent research before proceeding.
Third, one must ask what type of innovation is being purchased with
appropriation rents. Leaving the debate about incremental (“me-too”)
innovation to the side,284 the patent system encourages the production of
products that can be sold. Pills for wealthy people fit this category nicely.
Knowledge about the optimal conservation characteristics of antibiotics do
not. As the prior sections have demonstrated, the biological context will
determine, in many cases, the preferred IP and conservation policies for EPK.
Kades points out (correctly in my view) that comprehensive information about
optimal antibiotic usage is a public good with an optimal price of zero, and
thus will not be created in optimal amounts by private actors.285 Similarly, we
agree that the creation of new vaccines and diagnostic tools for EPK
conservation serves the public good.286 So it seems that the first priority for
legal support for R&D would be these classic public goods, which will be
underprovided by the market. Additional pharmaceutical appropriation rents
281. Kades, supra note 44, at 635-38.
282. At a 10% interest rate, the net present value of a $1 payment in year 21 is only 13.5 cents. In
one sense, the rate of inflation is a much more important factor than doubling the patent period.
283. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 220-22, and sources cited therein. For
conflicting perspectives, see generally supra note 126.
284. See supra note 125.
285. Kades, supra note 44, at 642-43.
286. Id. at 639-42.
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would be better spent on understanding current EPK287 rather than creating
anew.288 Most importantly, creation of these particular public goods do not
require any modification to the patent system, nor do they require Pigovian
taxes on consumers. These policy options are quite independent of Kades’
main program.
Fourth, any effective program to reduce unnecessary antibiotic use will
cut into sales of patented products, and thus, pharmaceutical appropriation.
(Whether this will largely “undermine” innovation289 or is actually an
efficiency gain290 remains to be proven.) Kades assumes a world of patent
rights, with innovation through appropriation. But other worlds are possible,
including the proposed Global R&D Treaty, patent buyouts, and innovation
prizes.291 Freed from the shackles of R&D cost recovery, drug markets would
become truly competitive. Perhaps these options are closer to a free market
than what we have today; they certainly would be less susceptible to rentseeking.292 The question of balancing pharmaceutical access and innovation
is open, and the discussion should include options that do not require R&D
cost recovery through consumer prices.
B. Creating New EPK Through Longer Patents
Several infectious disease experts have recently warned of a global
epidemic and the drought of antibiotic innovation.293 Prominent examples are
the June 2004 report of the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA),

287. In community-acquired pneumonia (CAP), a major disease category for EPK, inadequate clinical
information exists on which interventions provide the best cost-benefit. Barlow, supra note 256, at 39, 51.
Barlow’s review indicates that we do not know whether CAP quality improvement initiatives are costeffective. Id. at 51.
288. Similar cases could be made for investments in diagnostics and prophylactics, including
Pigovian subsidies for both. Kades supports subsidies for development of diagnostics and prophylactics,
but this proposal is in no way tied to the extension of patent terms for EPK. See Kades, supra note 44, at
631, 639-42. Diagnostics are probably not exhaustible resources; prophylactics might be. Again, much
longer patents do not provide the needed incentive. For a discussion on the importance of speedy and
accurate diagnostics in combating resistance, see Ian M. Gould, Antibiotic Use—Ecological Issues and
Actions, in ANTIBIOTIC POLICIES, supra note 4, at 710-12.
289. Kades, supra note 44, at 656.
290. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 217-22.
291. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
292. Fastow (2005) (working paper).
293. Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline—Challenges, Costs, and Values, 351 NEW ENG .
J. MED . 523-26 (2004); BAD BUGS, supra note 1; Projan, supra note 207, at 427-30 (Projan is employed
by Wyeth Research).
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Bad Bugs, No Drugs,294 and distinguished medical researcher Richard P.
Wenzel’s recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine.295 After
authoritative sections on infectious diseases and antibiotic resistance, these
reports then wander into patent policy, and generally propose additional
pharmaceutical rent appropriation to support R&D. The gloom and doom of
Bad Bugs, No Drugs includes some elements of Chicken Little. For the past
three years the pharmaceutical industry has highlighted the alleged drought of
new antibiotics,296 while lobbying Congress to grant additional tax, patent and
financial incentives for bioweapons defenses such as antibiotics.297 Shortly
before the Bad Bugs report went to press, in April 2004, the FDA approved
telithromycin (Ketek), the first antibiotic in a powerful new class known as
ketolides.298 Fourteen months later, in June 2005, a second new antibiotic
class was approved, tigecycline (Tygacil), the first drug in the glycylcyclines
class.299 The same month (June 2005), Pfizer announced the planned purchase
of Vicuron Pharmaceuticals Inc., the developer of dalbavancin, a valuable new
antibiotic which is expected to be approved by the FDA within a year.300 In
addition, linezolid became available in 2000 (the first oxazolidinone) and
daptomycin became available in 2003 (the first cyclic lipopeptide).301 The
reports of a “big-pharma” drought of novel antibiotics302 appears to have been
exaggerated.
Nevertheless, both reports suggest longer patent terms to stimulate
antibiotic innovation. Both reports assume, rather than prove, that additional
resources need to be directed to the pharmaceutical industry.303 Neither report
discusses the negative effect of patents on access to existing therapies304 or the

294. BAD BUGS, supra note 1.
295. Wenzel, supra note 293, at 523.
296. Projan, supra note 207, at 427-30; see also Wenzel, supra note 293 (“In 2004, there are few
antibacterial agents in the pipeline.”).
297. See, e.g., Sarah Lueck, ‘Bioshield’ Drug-Patent Plan Draws Fire, WALL ST . J., Apr. 1, 2005,
at A4 (incentives for anti-bioterrorism drugs).
298. Victoria Stagg Elliott, FDA Approves First Ketolide Antibiotic, AMA NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004.
299. Marc Kaufman, FDA Approves New Antibiotic for Resistant Bacteria, WASH . POST , June 17,
2005, at A14. For the official FDA approval see http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/
drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label_ApprovalHistory#apphist.
300. Scott Hensley, Pfizer to Buy Infection-Drug Maker, WALL ST . J., June 17, 2005, at B5. The
FDA Orange Book discloses no unexpired patents or periods of exclusivity for the tablet forms of
Zithromax.
301. Wenzel, supra note 293, at 523-26.
302. Projan, supra note 207, at 427-30.
303. See supra Section II.C.1 (critiquing the IP maximalist agenda).
304. See supra Section II.B (discussing the negative externality of access).
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relationship between inadequate access and accelerated resistance.305 They
are silent about the vanishing public domain. Both focus on a single type of
innovation—increasing the supply of new drugs—while neglecting
conservation R&D.306 If EPK is finite like fossil fuels, then this is a dangerous
and shortsighted strategy. None of the issues raised by the intersection of IP
law and biological complexity are discussed at all,307 even though infectious
diseases experts will be essential to understanding these issues.
The aforementioned reports identify a potential weakness in the current
pharmaceutical R&D system, namely, inadequate antibiotic innovation. But
the reports assume that the solution is to provide more intellectual property
rights. The IDSA and Wenzel are simply espousing the patent agenda of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA),308 an
organization representing pharmaceutical companies, with virtually no
independent analysis.
For example, the IDSA recommends adopting the following expansions
of pharmaceutical appropriation: additional tax credits, wildcard patent
extensions, longer patent periods, longer orphan drug periods, and reduced
FDA standards on safety and efficacy testing.309 One would think that in the
era of massive drug recalls that reductions in safety and efficacy testing might
be seen as dangerous.310 The IDSA addresses this exposure by proposing
additional liability protections for drug companies. The PhRMA wish list
ends with a “guaranteed market.”311 This is the IP maximalist agenda gone
wild.
One possible root of this bias can be traced to a joint IDSA/PhRMA/FDA
working group meeting in November 2002.312 The meeting roster included
many speakers sympathetic to PhRMA’s desire for greater pharmaceutical
appropriation, but apparently no one with a contrary view.313 The IDSA never

305. Intermittent access to medicines can accelerate resistance. Raising prices through enhanced
pharmaceutical appropriation rents may well accelerate resistance. See supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
306. See supra Section II.D.
307. See supra Section II.D.6.
308. NEED CITE
309. BAD BUGS, supra note 1, at 23-26.
310. For a thoughtful (pre-Vioxx) economic analysis of the risks and benefits of faster FDA reviews,
see Mary K. Olson, Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety of New Drugs, 45 J.L. & ECON . 615
(2002).
311. BAD BUGS, supra note 1, at 4.
312. See PH RMA WORKING GROUP, supra note 181.
313. For example, Francis P. Tally, M.D. from Cubist Pharmaceuticals, Inc. suggested that the
conservation technique of “reserving novel new antimicrobial agents for antimicrobial resistant pathogens”
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heard the other side of the story. The first speaker at the meeting was Richard
P. Wenzel.
Wenzel’s recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine
describes the resistance problem in the conventional fashion, but then assumes
that the solution is stronger IP rights. Wenzel supports the supply-side
argument with drug industry data ranking the risk-adjusted NPV return on
investment for various categories of biomedical research. The study
concludes that antibiotic research is profitable, but much less profitable than
neurologic or musculoskeletal R&D. Unfortunately, the data for this NPV
study was entirely derived from a single large drug company and cannot be
verified.314 Scientists trained in the tradition of double-blind clinical studies
should hesitate before embracing data generated exclusively by the interested
subjects. Public relations anecdotes from pharmaceutical companies do not
constitute reliable data.
Even if these data are accepted, they do not support an extension of patent
terms for antibiotics. The problem of disparate returns on investment could
be addressed by reducing the patent terms for drugs with higher financial
returns, making antibiotic research more fruitful by comparison.315
Alternatively, any market failure in antibiotic R&D may also be addressed
through other coordination mechanisms, as discussed in Section II.C.5 above.

not only “[d]oesn’t solve the problem” but also “[r]esults in decreased research in both big pharma and
biotech sectors.” PH RMA WORKING GROUP, supra note 181, at Tally presentation, slide 4. These
comments from the most recent developer of novel antibiotic (Cubicin/Daptomycin) illustrate the tension
between conservation and innovation, and the temptation to waste by a new market entrant. (Tally suggests
a conservation strategy of multiple novel drug combinations, which necessitates conservation across
classes.) PhRMA’s desire for enhanced pharmaceutical appropriation was presented by a senior FDA
administrator, Dr. Mark J. Goldberger, now the acting deputy director of CDER. Mark J. Goldberger, MD,
Antibiotic Resistance: Incentives for Antimicrobial Development, in PH RMA WORKING GROUP, supra note
181, at slide 7 (mentioning “wildcard exclusivity,” a form of transferable intellectual property rights where
a period of exclusivity is earned on one drug, the antibiotic or orphan drug, but used to garner additional
appropriation rents on another drug of the company’s choice, such as Lipitor). The speaker from
GlaxoSmithKline also noted the tension between conservation and strong market sales. David M.
Cocchetto, Regulatory and Other Incentives for Antibiotic Development, in PH RMA WORKING GROUP,
supra note 181, at slides 2-4. Cocchetto was particularly excited by the “high potential impact” (emphasis
in original) of wildcard exclusivity. Id. at slides 6, 17 (“Viable incentives can be achieved via ‘wild card’
market exclusivity and a new [FDA] Guidance.”)
314. The source of the NPV data was Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. Projan, supra note 207, at 428. The
underlying data was not disclosed; in fact, the chart is identified as “[a]n example of NPVs” rather than
actual data. Id. at 428. Remarkably, this “data” was cited by ISDA as a key finding in Bad Bugs. BAD
BUGS, supra note 1, at 3. Wenzel also relied on Projan’s NPV table in his article in the New England
Journal of Medicine. See Wenzel, supra note 293, at 523-26.
315. If pharmaceutical appropriation rents are already supra-optimal, this reduction would not harm
appropriate innovation. See generally Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 13, at 217-20.
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Increased National Institute of Health (NIH) funding for antibiotic R&D
would be another example. The financial incentive provisions of BioShield
II could be another.316 Researchers Croghan and Pittman note that executives
in many large pharmaceutical companies began their careers at a time when
the triumph over bacteria seemed complete, and thus shunned development of
antibiotics.317 Supporting graduate programs in infectious diseases and career
development grants through the NIH would begin to remedy these issues.
The pharmaceutical companies and their (unwitting) allies in infectious
diseases are pushing for expanded IP rights for antibiotics. This Article
suggests that many questions be addressed first, particularly the externalities
of waste and access, the complexities of EPK conservation, and the
interactions of all of these factors with pharmaceutical appropriation.
CONCLUSION
Markets create resistance, and resistance creates markets.318 When faced
with antibiotic resistance, how should society respond? While many are
calling for enhanced non-market solutions through enhanced IP law, this
Article suggests that we also consider the needs of the poor, as well as those
able to afford patented medicines. Society should tailor incentives to the
particular type of innovations which are being underprovided by the market.
Society also needs to focus on conservation and its complex interactions with
both the patent system and R&D. As important as these arguments are for
most health care goods, they are particularly salient for exhaustible
pharmaceutical knowledge. Otherwise, the public domain vanishes.

316. S. 666, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 3, 109th Cong. (2005). The bills include several incentive
mechanisms for development of antibiotics for defense against biological weapons. A work in progress will
critique the transferable intellectual property rights provisions of these bills.
317. Thomas W. Croghan & Patricia M. Pittman, The Medicine Cabinet: What’s In It, Why, And
Can We Change The Contents?, 23 HEALTH AFFS. 23, 29-30 (2004).
318. The phrase comes from David M. Shlaes, The Abandonment of Antibacterials: Why and
Wherefore?, 3 CURRENT OPINIONS IN PHARMACOLOGY 470, 472 (2003).

